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ARTICLES
RECONCILING INTERNATIONAL TRADE WITH
PRESERVATION OF THE GLOBAL COMMONS: CAN
WE PROSPER AND PROTECT?
JEFFREY L. DUNOFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
Through the ages, people have reached beyond their own borders
to obtain essential, valued, or exotic materials. Today's surer com-
munications and larger trade and capital movements have greatly
enlarged this process, quickened its pace, and endowed it with far-
reaching ecological implications.'
A series of global environmental crises-ozone depletion, climate change,
deforestation, species loss-has moved international environmental issues
from the periphery to the center of the world political stage. The recent
"Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, which focused on many of these
issues, was the largest meeting of heads of state in history.2 As a result of
this attention, international environmental treaties and regimes have been
proliferating at an astonishing rate.
3
However, one of the areas that has been largely ignored-until recently-
is the multifaceted relationship between international trade and the global
environment. 4 One of the most controversial issues within this area is the
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J.D. 1986, New York University School of Law; LL.M. 1992, Georgetown University Law
Center; 1991-92 Ford Foundation Fellow in Public International Law. Many friends and
colleagues commented on earlier versions of this article. Special thanks go to Theresa Glennon,
Richard Greenstein, David Kairys, Annie Petsonk, Richard B. Stewart, Edith Brown Weiss
and David Wippman. Research for this article was supported by a generous grant from the
Ford Foundation.
1. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 67
(1987) [hereinafter WCED].
2. James Brooke, U.N. Chief Closes Summit With an Appeal for Action, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 1992, at AS.
3. See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO PROTECT TME
ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE vii (1991) (identifying 170 international environmental treaties
and noting that approximately two-thirds of them have been signed in past twenty years).
4. Scholars, policymakers and advocates have started to address the relationship between
international trade and the environment. See, e.g., GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
TRADE SECRETARIAT, TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992) (advance copy) [hereinafter GATT
SECRETARIAT]; FRANCES CAIRNCROSS, COSTING THE EARTH 299-316 (1992); THE GREENING OF
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use of trade barriers' to protect the "global commons"-those areas or
resources outside the jurisdiction of any nation or group of nations, such
as the high seas, the atmosphere, and outer space. 6 Such "green" trade
barriers are becoming increasingly common. For example, this nation forbids
the importation of tuna caught in a manner that causes excessive dolphin
deaths! Similarly, nations that have signed the Montreal Protocol have
agreed to reduce their use of ozone depleting chemicals and to refrain from
trade in such chemicals with nations that have not become parties to this
treaty.' To protect marine life, the United States and other nations limit
the importation of fish caught in driftnets.9
These green trade barriers starkly present the conflict between the
imperative of environmental protection-as recognized by a growing body
of international environmental law10-and the prohibition of such barriers
in international trade law. The barriers raise difficult questions: can nations
restrict international trade to protect the global commons? If so, under
WORLD TRADE IssuEs (Kym Anderson & Richard Blackhurst eds., 1992); U.S. CONGRESS OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES (1992)
[hereinafter OTA REPORT]; Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and
Sustainable Development: A Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMu'. L. REV. 535 (1992); John
Whalley, The Interface Between Environmental and Trade Policies, 101 ECON. J. 180 (1991);
GATTery v. Greenery: The Perils of Eco-sanctions, ECONOMIST, May 30, 1992, at 12 (Supp.).
5. For purposes of this paper, the terms "trade barrier" and "green trade barrier"
refer to import or export restrictions, taxes on products or means of production, and other
restrictions on the free flow of goods across national borders designed to serve environmental
purposes.
6. This paper is limited to the issues.raised by the use of green trade barriers to protect
the global commons. The use of trade restrictions to preserve resources within the territory of
another nation raises somewhat different issues. For example, under international law, nations
have "the sovereign right to exploit their own [natural] resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies .. " Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, June 16, 1972, Principle 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1973), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 and Corr.1 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration].
Nations also have the right to develop their own economic and social systems. Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/9631, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). The attempts of one nation to protect
resources found within another nation must take account of these international law principles.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1371 (1988).
8. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26
I.L.M. 1550 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
9. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2)(E), 1822, 1826 (1988) (granting Secretary of Treasury
authority to impose trade sanctions on nations that driftnet); New Zealand: Driftnet Prohibition
Act 1991, 31 I.L.M. 214 (1992) (prohibiting landing or processing in New Zealand of any fish
or marine life taken using driftnet). In addition, the United Nations General Assembly has
called upon all nations to reduce and eventually phase out all large scale pelagic driftnet
fishing by December 31, 1992. Large-Scale Pelagic Drift-net Fishing and its Impact on the
Living Marine Resources of the World's Oceans and Seas, G.A. Res. 215, U.N. GAOR, 46th
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/215 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 241 (1992). Fifteen nations
have signed the Wellington Convention prohibiting fishing with long driftnets in the South
Pacific. Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific,
Nov. 24, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 1449.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 164-90.
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what conditions? To date, no international tribunal has developed a frame-
work for determining which such barriers are permissible. This article
represents an attempt to provide such a framework, focusing on the "tuna/
dolphin" dispute between the United States and Mexico as a paradigmatic
example of this issue.
The framework developed below is based on a careful balancing of the
underlying interests at stake. International trade rules serve three primary
interests: economic efficiency, sovereignty, and international political har-
mony." These trade interests must be weighed against the interest every
nation has in preserving our atmosphere, oceans, and other global commons
resources which are essential for human survival. To do so, I propose, a
balancing test that involves examination of several factors: the nature and
strength of the environmental interest being protected, whether the measure
favors domestic over foreign products, or discriminates among foreign
nations, and whether the measure is related to and proportionate to the
environmental goal.
12
This framework can be utilized by bodies that adjudicate disputes
involving the tensions between trade and the environment, such as the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 3 and the European Court
of Justice (ECJ).' 4 It could also guide negotiators in pending international
environmental and international trade negotiations. Finally, it could prof-
itably be used by domestic legislators as they consider the imposition of
future green trade barriers.
II. THE TUNA/DOuH'mN DISPUTE
A. Background
The most prominent example of the tension between the interest in
liberalized trade 5 and the interest in protecting a global commons resource
11. See infra text accompanying notes 90-130.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 214-62.
13. The GATT is both an international agreement, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. All, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT], and the principal
international institution and rule system governing most international trade in goods. At
present, over 100 nations are Contracting Parties to the GATT. The GATT sets forth dispute
resolution procedures in the event of a disagreement between two or more Contracting Parties.
GATT, supra, arts. XXII, XXIII, 61 Stat. at A64-65, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266-68.
14. The European Court of Justice is the judicial institution of the European Community,
and decides cases arising under the treaties establishing the European Community. Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 73
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome].
15. Although the GATT is commonly said to promote "free" trade, a more accurate
term is "liberal" trade because the GATT permits a variety of restrictions on the international
flow of goods. See, e.g., GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(e), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at
262 (authorizing restrictions on trade in goods made with slave labor); id. art. XXI, 61 Stat.
at A63, 55 U.N.T.S. at 266 (permitting trade restrictions on national security grounds). As
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is the tuna/dolphin dispute between the United States and Mexico considered
by a GATT dispute resolution panel.' 6 This dispute has attracted considerable
international attention. Australia, Canada, the European Community (rep-
resenting twelve member states), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Norway, the
Philippines, Senegal, Thailand, and Venezuela all filed submissions with the
dispute resolution panel in this action.'
7
What prompted this interest? Far off in the Eastern Tropical Pacific
Ocean (ETP),8 dolphins and yellowfin tuna associate with each other in an
unusual manner. Dolphins often swim directly above schools of tuna that
are foraging for food. 19 The dolphins come to the surface to breathe and
thus are seen easily from fishing vessels. Taking advantage of the tuna/
dolphin relationship, fishermen encircle dolphins with huge purse seine nets, 20
which are used to catch the tuna below the surface.2' When the nets are
gathered, the dolphins become the unfortunate and "incidental" victims of
the tuna catch.
The United States pioneered the practice of purse seine fishing in the
ETP during the late 1950s. 22 During the 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S.
fleet accounted for nearly all of the tuna catch and corresponding dolphin
deaths. At this time, as many as 400,000 dolphins per year were being
killed as a result of purse seine fishing. In response, Congress passed the
others have noted, the GATT negotiators assumed that governments would continue to regulate
and intervene in national economies, and that such actions would necessarily include some
controls on international trade. See John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and
Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT'L ORG. 379, 385-88
(1982).
16. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report].
17. Id. paras. 4.1-.30, at 1610-16.
18. Under relevant United States regulations, the Eastern Tropical Pacific is defined as
the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by 40 degrees north latitude, 40 degrees south latitude,
160 degrees west longitude, and the coasts of North, Central, and South America. 50 C.F.R.
§ 216.3 (1991).
19. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para..2.2, at 1598.
20. A purse seine net is:
A large seine [net] designed to be set by two boats around a school of fish and so
arranged that after the ends have been brought together the bottom can be closed
... having the upper edge supported by floats and the lower edge weighted by brass
rings through which the purse line passes, and being closed below when the ends of
the net have been brought together by the dropping of a heavy lead weight..that is
attached over pulleys to the ends of the purse line and that by its descent puckers
together the bottom of the net.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1847 (4th ed. 1976).
21. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 2.2, at 1598.
22. See generally JAMES JOSEPH & JOSEPH W. GREENOUGH, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT
OF TUNA, PORPOISE, AND BILLFISH: BIOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS (1979) (discussing
United States use of purse seine fishing). An excellent discussion of the global purse seine
industry is contained in David J. Doulman, Development and Expansion of the Tuna Purse
Seine Fishery, in TUNA ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS REGION 133-60 (David
J. Doulman ed., 1987).
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Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). 23 This Act bans the "taking"
of marine mammals, 24 but contains an exception for commercial tuna
fishing. 25 Pursuant to this exception, the American Tunaboat Association,
a trade association of U.S. fishermen, is accorded a general permit to
take a limited number of dolphins in the course of its commercial fishing
operations. 26 The Act also provides for a ban on the importation of tuna
caught by foreign fishermen who use technology which results in an
incidental marine mammal taking rate greater than U.S. standards.
27
The MMPA was extremely successful in reducing the number of dolphin
takings by the U.S. tuna fleet. The annual incidental mortality of dolphins
in the U.S. fleet decreased from an estimated 400,000 per year in the early
1970s to fewer than 20,500 in the 1980s. 21 However, while the incidental
taking rate of the U.S. fleet was declining, there was a dramatic increase
in foreign tuna fishing efforts29 and in incidental dolphin takings by foreign
fleets. By the mid-1980s, foreign fleets were killing several times more
dolphins than the U.S. fleet.30 In addition, as U.S. fishermen were taking
conservation measures not used by their foreign competitors, the MMPA
placed the U.S. fleet at a competitive disadvantage. In response, Congress
amended the MMPA to address more effectively the practices of foreign
fleets. 3'
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988).
24. For purposes of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), to "take" means
"to harass, hunt, capture, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture or kill any marine
mammal." 16 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (1988).
25. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a)(2), 1374 (1988).
26. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(2). In October 1976, the National Marine Fisheries Service
proposed regulations setting a quota of 61,409 incidental takings. 41 Fed. Reg. 45,015-16
(1976). In 1980, this number was reduced to 20,500. 50 C.F.R. § 216.24(d)(2)(i)(A)(3) (1981).
Pursuant to a 1984 amendment to the MMPA, this figure was written into the act. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1374(h)(2) (1988).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1988). This provision states, in relevant part, that "[tlhe
Secretary of the Treasury shall ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish
which have been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in the incidental kill
or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in excess of United States standards."
28. 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (1990).
29. For example, Mexico's fleet grew by nearly 50% during the 1980s, while the
Venezuelan fleet more than tripled in size during that time period. MARINE MAMMAL COMMIS-
SION, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 93 (1991).
30. For example, in 1987, the U.S. tuna fleet killed 13,992 dolphins, while foreign fleets
killed over 100,000 dolphins. S. REp. No. 592, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988). In the following
year, foreign fleets accounted for 68% of the eastern Pacific fleet and 85% of the incidental
dolphin mortalities. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 2926
and H.R. 2948 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Envi-
ronment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 201
(1989) (statement of Christopher Croff, Director, The Dolphin Coalition).
31. The amendments also imposed new requirements on U.S. fishermen. For example,
to address the problem of higher dolphin mortality in evening sets, the 1988 amendments
specified that U.S. tuna fishermen must complete the practice of backdown to remove porpoises
from the net no later than 30 minutes after sundown. In addition, the amendments prohibited
the use of certain types of explosives during sets on marine mammals. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(h)(B)(iv),
(vii) (1988).
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The amended Act provides for a ban on the importation of tuna caught
by foreign fishermen using purse seine nets in the ETP, unless that nation's
government demonstrated that it has (1) implemented a dolphin protection
program "comparable" to that of the U.S. fleet, and (2) achieved an
incidental dolphin kill rate "comparable" to the U.S. fleet.3 2 To be consid-
ered comparable after 1991, the average incidental dolphin mortality rate
may not exceed 1.25 times the average for U.S. vessels for the same period.33
In addition, the share of eastern spinner dolphin and coastal spotted dolphin
may not exceed fifteen percent and two percent, respectively, of the total
number of dolphins taken.
3 4
Under the amended law, the United States embargoed tuna caught by
Mexican fishermen, even if it came to the United States via a third country.
35
Outraged by this embargo, Mexico took its grievance to the GATT.3 6 At
Mexico's request a dispute resolution panel was formed37 to examine whether
the U.S. embargo violated its obligations under the GATT. In particular,
Mexico charged that the U.S. action violated GATT provisions prohibiting
import quotas and discrimination against foreign products.3"
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1988).
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(II) (1988).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B)(III) (1988); see also Regulations Governing the Importation
of Tuna Taken in Association with Marine Mammals, 54 Fed. Reg. 9438 (1989) (interim final
rule); Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals Incidental to Commercial Fishing Operations,
55 Fed. Reg. 11,921 (1990) (final rule).
35. The import ban was imposed as a result of a lawsuit filed by an environmental
group seeking enforcement of the MMPA's mandatory embargo provisions. Earth Island Inst.
v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); see
also Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 2.5, at 1599. In May, 1991, this
embargo was extended to several other nations-including Japan, Costa Rica, Italy, France
and Panama-that export tuna to the United States. Tuna from those nations was not permitted
into the United States absent a certification that the tuna was not caught by the Mexican fleet.
36. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, at 1598 n.1 (request no. C/M/246/27).
37. Although the formal provisions of the GATT do not refer to dispute resolution
panels, the Contracting Parties regularly refer disputes to such panels. Understanding Regarding
Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907 (Nov.
28, 1979), BAsic INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DocuMENTS [hereinafter BISD] 26th Supp. 210
[hereinafter GATT Understanding]; Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and
Procedures, GATT Doc. L/6489 (Apr. 12, 1989), BISD 36th Supp. 61; see also Eric Canal-
Forgues & Rudolf Ostrihansky, New Developments in the GA 7TDispute Settlement Procedures,
J. WoRLD TRADE L., Apr. 1990, at 67.
38. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, at 1598 n.2. Mexico also challenged the
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA), which regulates the use of the term
"dolphin safe" and prohibits use of that term on cans of tuna harvested in the ETP through
setting on dolphins with purse seine nets. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. I 1990). In addition,
Mexico challenged the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act, which authorizes
the ban of fish products from nations embargoed under the MMPA. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)
(1988). The Panel held that the DPCIA did not violate the General Agreement, Tuna/Dolphin
Panel Report, supra note 16, paras. 5.41-.44, at 1622, and that the Pelly Amendment was not
facially inconsistent with the General Agreement. Id. paras. 5.20-.21, at 1619.
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B. The GA TT Panel Report
The tuna/dolphin dispute was the first time a GATT panel faced a
conflict between the interest in liberalized trade and the interest in protecting
a global commons resource. The Panel Report can be usefully analyzed by
separating its analysis into two component parts. The first part examines
whether the U.S. import ban violates the GATT, while the second part
analyzes whether the ban is justified by any GATT exceptions. 9 .
1. Product v. Production Process
The Panel first examined whether the U.S. measure should be analyzed
under GATT Article III as an internal regulation enforced at the point of
importation, or under Article XI as a qualitative restriction on imports. °
The United States argued that Article III applied. This article permits
internal regulations on products imported from other contracting parties so
long as they do not afford protection to domestic production and accord
to imported products treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin.4 1 The United States also relied upon the Note
Ad Article III, which provides:
Any internal tax ... or any law, regulation or requirement of the
kind referred to in [Article III:11 which applies to an imported
product and the like domestic product and is collected or enforced
in the case of the imported product at the time or point of
importation, is ... subject to the provisions of Article III. 2
According to the United States, the import embargo was an enforcement
at the point of importation of the MMPA incidental taking regulations,
and thus within the purview of Article III. The United States also argued
that the MMPA was nondiscriminatory because the requirements regarding
the production of imported tuna were no less favorable than the require-
ments for tuna caught by the U.S. fleet. The Panel flatly rejected this
argument. The Panel initially focused on whether the MMPA import pro-
39. The Panel adopted a similar approach. It "decided that it would examine ... [the
issues] first in the light of the provisions of the General Agreement which Mexico claims to
have been violated by the United States and then, if it were to find an inconsistency with any
of the provisions invoked by Mexico, in the light of the exceptions in the General Agreement
raised by the United States." Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.7, at 1616-
17.
40. Id. para. 5.8, at 1617.
41. GATT Article 111:4 provides that
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of
any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use.
Id. para. 5.9, at 1617.
42. Id.
1992]
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visions were measures "applie[d] to" ir~ported and domestic tuna within
the meaning of Article III and the Note Ad Article III. 41 The Panel noted
that Article III refers to the application of laws and regulations to products
and to internal "regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of
products."44 Article III also establishes the principle that "regulations on
products not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.
'45
From this language, the Panel concluded that "Article III covers only
measures affecting products as such.""
The Panel then reasoned that the MMPA embargo did not fall within
the scope of Article III because the U.S. ban on Mexican tuna was unrelated
to any inherent characteristic of the product-yellowfin tuna-itself. As the
Panel explained:
the MMPA regulates the domestic harvesting of yellowfin tuna to
reduce the incidental taking of dolphin, but ... these regulations
could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such
because they would not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could
not possibly affect tuna as a product. 47
The Panel thus sharply differentiated between a particular product and that
product's production process. Under the Panel's reasoning, Article III
requires a comparison between products of the exporting and importing
nations, and not a comparison between different nation's production proc-
esses that have no effect on the product qua product.
After concluding that Article III was inapplicable, the Panel had little
difficulty concluding that the MMPA embargo violated GATT Article XI.
This article provides that "[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than duties,
taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas . . . or other
measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party ...
on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting
party.' '48 Article XI thus forbids the use of quotas, embargoes and other
"quantitative" restrictions on imports and exports and permits contracting
parties to regulate imports and exports through tariffs. The ban on tuna
caught by Mexico blatantly contradicted the general prohibition on quan-
titative import restrictions. The Panel dryly noted that "It]he United States
did not present to the Panel any arguments to support a different legal
conclusion regarding Article XI."'
49
43. Id. para. 5.10, at 1617.
44. Id. para. 5.11, at 1617 (emphasis in original).
45. Id. (emphasis in original).
46. Id. A similar analysis led to the conclusion that the Note Ad Article III also applied
only to "those measures that are applied to products as such." Id. para. 5.14, at 1618.
47. Id. para. 5.14, at 1618.
48. GATT, supra note 13, art. XI(l), 61 Stat. at A32-33, 55 U.N.T.S. at 224-26.
49. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.18, at 1618. The United States
did not oppose the assertion that its embargo was contrary to the prohibition on quantitative
restrictions; rather, it argued that the Mexican tuna embargo was not governed by Article XI
and, in any event, the embargo was permitted under Article XX.
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This part of the Panel report clearly stands for the principle that "it is
not possible under GATT's rules to make access to one's own market
dependent on the domestic environmental policies or practices of the ex-
porting country." 0 Although a detailed analysis of the significance of the
product/process distinction is beyond the scope of this Article,-" the Panel's
reasoning has significant implications for the use of green trade barriers.
Nations seeking to protect global commons resources have imposed barriers
to trade in products produced by environmentally destructive processes. The
London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol require parties to determine
the feasibility of banning or restricting trade in products "produced with,
but not containing" ozone-depleting chemicals. 2 Similarly, nations have
banned the importation of fish and fish products caught by driftnets.53 The
Panel's analysis suggests that these green trade barriers are incompatible
with the obligations imposed by international trade law.
2. The Article XX Exceptions
After concluding that the tuna embargo violated Article XI, the Panel
focused on whether exceptions contained in GATT Article XX justified this
trade barrier.54 Article XX provides that:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a
manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail,
or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this
50. GAII SECRETARIAT, supra note 4, at 10.
51. As explained more fully below, the question of whether a green trade barrier regulates
a "product" or a "process" ought not to be determinative. Rather, the focus should be on
the interest protected by the particular green trade barrier, and the costs the barrier imposes
on the trading regime. "Process" based trade restrictions come in many varieties. They can
seek to protect interests wholly within another nation, or a global commons resource. They
may seek to protect a global commons resource pursuant to international treaty, or may seek
to protect a resource unprotected by international law. The restriction itself may or may not
be related to the resource to be protected. These and other factors outlined below can-and
should-be used to distinguish between various process based trade restrictions. The use of
such limiting principles undermines the assertion that to permit "process" based trade restric-
tions "would be to open a pandora's box of problems that could open large loopholes in the
GATT." John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or
Conflict?, 49 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1243 (1992).
52. Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
June 29, 1990, UNEP/OzL. Pro. 2/3, Treaty Doc. 102-4, at XV [hereinafter London Amend-
ments].
53. See supra note 9.
54. Under GATT precedent, the burden of justification is on the party invoking the
Article XX exception. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.22, at 1619 (citing
Report of the GAYT Panel, Canada-Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act,
para. 5.20, GATT Doc. L/5504 (Feb. 7, 1984), BISD 30th Supp. 140, 164; Report of the
GATT Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, para. 5.27, GATT Doc.
L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), BISD 36th Supp. 345, 393).
14151992]
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Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforce-
ment by any contracting party of measures...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural re-
sources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption;
55
The Panel acknowledged that neither of these clauses is expressly limited
to the protection of environmental interests within the territory or jurisdic-
tion of the state, and that no panel had previously addressed the question
of whether these clauses could be used to protect animal life outside the
jurisdiction of the sanctioning state.16 The Panel, therefore, decided to
examine this Article's drafting history, its purpose, and the consequences
of the interpretations urged by the parties to the dispute.
Turning first to the drafting history, the Panel noted that Article XX(b)
is derived from a U.S. proposal for the Draft Charter of the International
Trade Organization.17 The U.S. proposal read: "Nothing [in the Draft
Charter] shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Member of measures ... necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health. '58 In a later draft, the preamble was revised to read as it does
at present, and exception (b) read: "For the purpose of protecting human,
animal or plant life or health, if corresponding domestic safeguards under
similar conditions exist in the importing country."5 9 According to The Panel,
this proviso was designed to address concerns that importing nations might
abuse sanitary regulations, but was later dropped as unnecessary 0 From
this scant history, the Panel concluded that "the concerns of the drafters
of Article XX(b) focused on the use of sanitary measures to safeguard life
or health of humans, animals or plants within the jurisdiction of the
importing country. ' 61
The drafting history cited by the Panel hardly compels-or even favors-
the Panel's conclusion. To the contrary, although the drafting history
indicates that the parties were concerned, inter alia, with sanitary provisions
protecting their own citizens, no evidence exists in the negotiations the
55. GATT, supra note 13, art. XX, 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
56. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.25, at 1619-20.
57. The International Trade Organization (ITO) was proposed as an international organ-
ization governing many areas of international economic activity. KENNETH W. DAM, THE
GATT-LAw AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 10-12 (1970). GATT's trade pro-
visions were to be part of the ITO. Id. When it became evident that, due to domestic politics
in the United States, the ITO would not come into existence, the GATT assumed the role
with respect to trade that the ITO would have played. Id.
58. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.26, at 1620.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. Id.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
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Panel relies upon that even hints that nations are limited to protecting
animal or plant life within its borders. Moreover, the additional proviso
was dropped for two separate reasons. First, as the Chairman of the
Preparatory Committee that drafted this Article stated, it is "not clear and
practically impossible to explain in a satisfactory way." 62 Second, the proviso
was dropped because its meaning was "already covered in the headnote
[i.e., the language prohibiting disguised restriction[s] on trade] to the Ar-
ticle." 63 This drafting history simply does not support the conclusion that
the drafters of Article XX(b) intended to disable nations from protecting
global commons resources through the use of green trade barriers. 6
A more accurate reading of the drafting history suggests that the drafters
did not consider whether Article XX(b) authorized trade restrictions to
protect human, plant or animal life located outside of the sanctioning state's
jurisdiction. The drafters sought to ensure that Article XX(b) restrictions
were not used to discriminate against imported products or to protect
domestic producers. 6s This provision thus reflects the antiprotectionist prin-
ciple that animates the GATT," as well as the preamble to Article XX.
The Panel also analyzed the purpose of this exception. It noted that
Article XX "allows each contracting party to set its [own] human, animal
or plant health standards," subject to the conditions set forth in the
preamble, namely that any trade measures be "necessary" and not constitute
a disguised trade restriction. 67 This provision permits parties to utilize trade
restrictive measures incompatible with the GATT to pursue "overriding
public policy goals to the extent such inconsistencies [are] unavoidable.
6
Significantly, the Panel never expressly determined whether the MMPA's
policy goal-to protect dolphins in the high seas-is "overriding" and
therefore justifies the use of trade measures that would otherwise be
62. Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment, U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/PV/30, at 13 (remarks of Chairman). Com-
menting on the same clause, the United States delegate complained that "no one knows exactly
what it means." Id. at 11.
63. DAM, supra note 57, at 194 (citation omitted).
64. An extended analysis of Article XX's drafting history can be found in Steve
Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, J. WORLD TRADE
L., Oct. 1991, at 37.
65. See DAm, supra note 57, at 194 (arguing that Article XX headnote incorporates
notion that "disguised protection" includes the failure to accord "national treatment" to
imports).
66. As the GATT Secretariat has stated, "ft]he rules of the General Agreement are
concerned primarily with preventing discrimination, that is, with limiting the extent to which
countries can discriminate between home products and imports, [and] between imports from
different countries, and between goods sold in the home market and those exported." GATT
SEcRTrARiAT, supra note 4, at 7.
67. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.27, at 1620.
68. Id. (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report
on Thai Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, paras. 73-74, 30
I.L.M. 1122, 1137-38 (1991)).
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ificonsistent with the GATT. 69 Resolution of this issue would seem to turn,
in the first instance, on whether any particular nation could have an
"overriding" interest in the protection of human, animal or plant life or
health -outside of its borders. Although ignored by the Panel, the sheer
volume of international agreements signed since the GATT, imposing obli-
gations on states to protect human, animal or plant life or health outside
its borders, suggests that the international community has answered this
question in the affirmative. 70
Rather than address the issue of whether a nation can have an overriding
interest in the life or health of beings outside its borders, the Panel
determined that the U.S. tuna embargo was not "necessary" for purposes
of Article XX(b). Earlier GATT panels had determined that a trade measure
is not "necessary" "if an alternative measure which [the nation] could
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent with other
GATT provisions is available to it."''7 Utilizing this test, the Panel deter-
mined that the U.S. measure was not "necessary" for two independent
reasons.
First, the United States had not demonstrated that it had exhausted all
options reasonably available to it and consistent with the GATT to pursue
its dolphin protection objectives. In particular, the United States had not
demonstrated that it had attempted to negotiate an international cooperative
agreement to protect the dolphins. 72 Second, the permissible Mexican inci-
dental dolphin taking rate for a particular period was linked to the actual
taking rate of the U.S. fleet during that same period. Under this system,
"the Mexican authorities could not know whether, at a given point in time,
their policies conformed to the United States' dolphin protection standards"
and could not adjust their conduct accordingly. 73 The Panel concluded that
69. In the context of a challenge to a measure designed to protect the health of a nation's
own citizens, an earlier Panel had stated that Article XX(b) "clearly allowed contracting parties
to give priority to human health over trade liberalization .. " General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on Thai Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, para. 73, 30 I.L.M. 1122, 1137 (1991) [hereinafter Thailand
Cigarette Panel Report].
70. A partial listing of treaties imposing obligations to protect resources outside a state's
jurisdiction is found at infra note 178.
Moreover, the GATT itself recognizes that such "extraterritorial" interests exist, and can
be used to restrict international trade. Thus, for example, the GATT authorizes nations to
adopt trade measures "relating to the products of prison labour." GATT, supra note 13, art.
XX(e), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262. Surely this provision reflects, in part, every
nation's interest in using trade measures to curb actions harmful to the life or health of
individuals outside of its jurisdiction.
71. Report of the GATT Panel, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,
para. 5.26, GATT Doc. L/6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), BISD 36th Supp. 345, 392-93. Although this
panel was interpreting the term "necessary" for purposes of Article XX(d), a later panel
utilized this definition in its interpretation of Article XX(b). Thailand Cigarette Panel Report,
supra note 69, para. 74, at 1137-38.
72. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.28, at 1620.
73. Id.
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a restriction "based on such unpredictable conditions" was not "necessary"
for purposes of Article XX(b). 74
Once again, the Panel's reasoning is less than persuasive. As a factual
matter, the Panel's assertion that the United States had not engaged in
multilateral efforts to address the tuna/dolphin problem is simply incor-
rect. In fact, through the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
(IATTC), 5 the United States has been involved in ongoing attempts to
address this issue.7 6 In 1977, the IATTC was given the responsibility of
introducing measures to reduce the incidental taking of dolphins to the
maximum extent possible. 7 The United States has actively pursued dolphin
conservation programs in the IATTC. For example, in 1990, the United
States proposed that the IATTC adopt international marine mammal
quotas that would be progressively reduced over time to levels approaching
zero.
7 1
The Panel's second reason for finding that the tuna embargo was not
"necessary" is likewise not persuasive. The conclusion that the MMPA's
method of determining the permissible taking rate for foreign fleets is
"unpredictable" does not answer the question of whether it is "necessary."
Significantly, neither Mexico nor the Panel suggested an alternative meas-
ure reasonably available to the United States that would effectively serve
the MMPA's conservationist purposes. On this record, the Panel's con-
clusion that the embargo was not "necessary" is unsupported.
Finally, the Panel turned to an examination of the "consequences"
of the positions advanced by the parties. The Panel feared that permitting
trade restrictions designed to protect resources outside a nation's borders
would undermine the international trading system. If such restrictions were
permitted, then the GATT would "provide legal security only in respect
of trade between a limited number of contracting parties with identical
74. Id.
75. The IATTC is an international body established in 1949 to make recommendations
for the management and conservation of the tuna resources of the eastern Pacific Ocean.
Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31,
1949, 1 U.S.T. 230, 80 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Donald L. McKernan, World Fisheries-World
Concern, in WoR.LD FixssRaus POLICY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY Vsaws 35, 42-43 (Brian J. Rothschild
ed., 1972) (summarizing of IATTC functions).
76. See MAINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 103; see also INTER-AMERICAN
TROPICAL TUNA COMMISSION, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1978); INTER-AmERicAN TROPICAL
TUNA COMMISSION, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 8-9 (1988) [hereinafter IATTC-1987 ANNUAL RE-
PORT].
77. IATTC-1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 76, at 38-39. Although Mexico withdrew
from the IATTC in 1978, Jon Van Dyke & Susan Hefter, Tuna Management in the Pacific:
An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency, 3 U. HAw. L. REv. 1 (1981), it
will soon rejoin this organization. Review of the Administration's Proposal to Promote Dolphin
Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 102nd Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1992).
78. MARINE MAMMAL COMMISSION, supra note 29, at 103.
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internal regulations. ' 79 Eager to avoid such a result, the Panel concluded
that nations could not restrict trade to protect global commons resources.
It is instructive to note the rhetorical strategy employed by the Panel.
The Panel simply asserted, without analysis, that allowing this measure
would permit any nation to dictate the environmental policies of other
nations, upon pain of losing trade privileges. The Panel declared that "if
the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) suggested by the United States
were accepted, each contracting party could unilaterally determine the life
or health protection policies from which other contracting parties could
not deviate without jeopardizing their rights tinder the General Agree-
ment."80 Once again, the Panel substituted assertion for analysis. As
demonstrated below, it is possible-and desirable-to construct a legal
framework that would permit the use of some green trade barriers without
undermining the global trading system.
The Panel employed many of the same arguments in its discussion of
the Article XX(g) exception. This exception permits trade measures "re-
lating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic produc-
tion. . ,,"I Under GATT precedent, a measure is deemed to be taken
"in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production" only if it is
"primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions. ' 82 The Panel
determined that this test was not met for two reasons. First, because the
permissible Mexican incidental dolphin taking rate was based on the actual
United States incidental taking rate, the Mexicans could not know whether
their fishing practices at any point in time conformed with the U.S.
standards. According to the Panel, "a limitation on trade based on such
unpredictable conditions could not be regarded as being primarily aimed
at the conservation of dolphins. ' 83
Again, the language of the exception and GATT precedent do not
support use of a "predictability" test. Moreover, as noted above, the
trade measure under challenge was enacted specifically to render effective
the MMPA's restrictions on domestic production of tuna.84 Congress
enacted the MMPA provisions regarding foreign fleets because it was
concerned that, absent controls on foreign fleets, the decrease in takings
by the U.S. fleet was being offset by an increase in takings by foreign
fleets. As a Senate report states:
While the U.S. industry has made dramatic improvements since
enactment of the MMPA, unregulated tuna fleets of foreign nations
79. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para 5.27, at 1620.
80. Id.
81. GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(g), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
82. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.31, at 1620-21 (citation omitted).
83. Id. para. 5.33, at 1621.
84. There may have been other, less benign motives present as well. See text accompanying
notes 273-79.
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now present a far more serious source of porpoise mortality.. .
[As a result, tiougher restrictions were determined to be necessary
to ensure that nations seeking to import tuna into the United
States required their own fishermen to adhere to standards for
porpoise protection comparable to our own. Amendments adopted
in 1984 [required foreign nations] to adopt a program for pro-
tecting porpoise tuna fishing operations comparable to the U.S.
program.S
Thus, the MMPA's trade measures regarding foreign fleets are, as the
GATT requires, "in conjunction with restrictions on domestic produc-
tion," and are "primarily aimed at rendering effective these restrictions."
The restrictions would thus seem to fall squarely within the scope of the
Article XX(g) exception."
The Panel also restated the "slippery slope" argument. According to
the Panel, if this trade measure were permitted, then "each contracting
party could unilaterally determine the conservation policies from which
other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights
under the [GATT]."187 Relying on the "unpredictability" and the "slippery
slope" arguments, the Panel rejected the "extraterritorial" application of
Article XX(g).
The interest in liberalized trade is so deeply embedded in the GATT
context that the Panel felt no need even to attempt to describe the benefits
or interests served by the U.S. embargo, or to explain the embargo's
detrimental effects on world trade. As the Panel believed it was staring
down a slippery slope, it did not even consider whether any limiting
principles could be found that both permit and constrain the use of green
trade barriers. Thus, the Panel "stressed the all-or-nothing choice which
Article XX presents." 88 The GATT Secretariat likewise has warned that
permitting nations to condition market access on another state's environ-
mental practices is "a big step down a slippery slope." 8 9
This Article will argue that the slippery slope argument is mistaken
and will suggest a number of limiting principles that would permit pro-
tection of the global commons without destroying the international trading
regime. The slippery slope argument represents an attempt to avoid the
difficult enterprise of developing such a set of principles. However, by
evading this issue, the Panel left unacknowledged the important environ-
mental concerns at stake.
III. INTERESTS AT STAKE
To determine whether-and when-nations should be permitted to
restrict trade to protect global commons resources, it is necessary to examine
85. S. REP. No. 592, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1988).
86. The Tuna/Dolphin Panel did not discuss the legislative history of the MMPA's
foreign fleet provisions.
87. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.32, at 1621.
88. GATT SECRETARIAT, supra note 4, at 15.
89. Id. at 25.
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the interests served by the international trade regime as well as the interests
ser;ved by international environmental law. I shall first explore the three
primary interests served by the international trade regime: economic effi-
ciency, sovereignty and political harmony.
A. Trade Interests
1. The Economic Interest
The economic argument underlying the international trade regime rests
largely upon the theory of comparative advantage. As explained by David
Ricardo:
Under a system of perfectly free [international] commerce, each
country naturally devotes its capital and labour to such employments
as are most beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage
is admirably connected with the universal good of the whole. By
stimulating industry, by rewarding ingenuity, and by using most
efficaciously the peculiar powers bestowed by nature, it distributes
labour most effectively and most economically: while, by increasing
the general mass of productions, it diffuses general benefit .... 9
That is, in the absence of barriers to trade, each nation will specialize in
the production and export of goods and services that it can produce relatively
more efficiently than other nations. This, in turn, increases the efficiency
of international production and results in increased trade and greater ag-
gregate welfare. As a result, consumers enjoy lower prices and greater
availability of goods. Under this theory, trade restrictions are inefficient
and divert resources from their most highly valued uses.
In the past few years the world has witnessed an extraordinary prolif-
eration of multilateral efforts to reduce barriers to international trade.
Perhaps the most 'visible of these efforts consists of the actions of several
different groups of nations to create or expand various forms of economic
integration, including "free trade areas" or "common markets." For ex-
ample, the United States and Canada, which have entered into a Free Trade
Agreement, 9' recently reached agreement with Mexico to form a North
American Free Trade Area. 92 Similarly, members of the European Com-
90. DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 81 (J.M.
Dent & Sons 1911) (1817).
91. Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 293 [hereinafter FTA].
92. Keith Bradsher, Economic Accord Reached by U.S., Mexico and Canada Lowering
Trade Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, at Al. This treaty must be ratified by legislatures
in each country before it enters into force. Id. This accord will liberalize trade in goods and
services and create a trading bloc with a greater population and economic output than that of
the European Economic Community. See generally M. Delol Baer, North American Free
Trade, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 132 (1991).
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munity and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)93 have negotiated
the formation of the European Economic Area, which will create a free
trade area consisting of nineteen nations and a market of 353 million
producers and consumers, accounting for over one-quarter of the world's
gross national product. 94
Nations with less developed economies are also attempting to enjoy the
fruits of economic integration. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay
have, by treaty, agreed to create a "Southern cone" common market by
December 31, 1994. 91 Under this treaty, these nations will eliminate barriers
to the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between
themselves and establish a common external tariff and a common trade
policy in relation to third countries.
In addition, over fifty member nations of the Organization of African
Unity have agreed to form an African Economic Community (AEC). 96 The
AEC is designed to remove obstacles to the "free movement of persons,
goods, services and capital and the right of residence and establishment,"
create a common African market, and establish a common external tariff.97
The treaty provides that the AEC is to be formed progressively in six stages
which shall occur over a period not to exceed thirty-four years. 9
Finally, 108 nations are engaged in intensive negotiations to expand the
GATT itself.99 These discussions started in Punta del Este, Uruguay in
September, 1986, where representatives of seventy-four nations set an agenda
for a new round of multilateral trade negotiations. Pursuant to this agenda,
GATT parties are negotiating an increase or extension of GATT rules over
trade in agricultural products and services and trade related to foreign
investment. The belief that liberalized trade will increase economic efficiency
and welfare underlies these various international initiatives.
2. The Sovereignty Interest
A second important interest is served by international trade rules: respect
for the sovereignty of all nations. In this context, sovereignty refers to the
basic legal status of a nation that is' not subject, within its territorial
jurisdiction, to the governmental or judicial jurisdiction of a foreign nation
93. Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland are
members of EFTA. See Lest a Fortress Arise, ECONOMIST, Oct. 26, 1991, at 81.
94. E.P.M. Gardner, The European Free Trade Association and the European Com-
munity, 25 INT'L LAW. 187, 188 (1991).
95. Treaty Establishing a Common Market Between the Argentine Republic, the Feder-
ative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041; Nathaniel Nash, Moving Closer to a $500 Billion Dream,
N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1992, at F8.
96. Organization of African Unity Member States: Treaty Establishing the African
Economic Community, June 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1241.
97. Id. art. 3, at 1252-53.
98. Id. art. 6, at 1254-55.
99. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Jumpstarting GATT, 83 FOREIGN POL'Y 105 (1991).
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or to foreign law other than public international law.' °° This principle forms
one of the cornerstones of contemporary international law. As the Inter-
national Court of Justice recently observed, "the whole of international law
rests . .. [upon the] fundamental principle of State sovereignty . .. .,1o1
Of course, by participating in- the international trade regime, nations
cede some degree of sovereignty. For example, nations larjely surrender the
ability to erect protectionist trade barriers. However, in exchange, the trade
regime significantly furthers the interest in sovereignty in at least two
respects. First, with certain limited exceptions, the trade regime severely
limits the ability of one state to interfere in the internal or domestic affairs
of another state by prohibiting states from conditioning market access upon
another nation's domestic practices.' 02 For example, under the GATT one
nation could not- restrict trade with another nation simply because it dis-
approved of that nation's social welfare system, the structure of its education
system, or its handling of other domestic affairs. Adopting this principle,
Mexico argued to the Tuna/Dolphin Panel that it-rather than the U.S.
government-should regulate the Mexican fishing fleet, and that the United
States could not restrict trade in an effort to coerce changes in Mexico's
fishing regulations. To the extent that green trade barriers represent an
attempt by one state to change the environmental practices of another
nation, they seem to conflict with this sovereignty interest.
Respect for sovereignty would also suggest that one nation should not
be permitted to transfer the costs of its policies to another nation. A number
of international decisions have emphasized the principle that one nation
cannot transfer the costs of its pollution to other states. 03 The GATT
Tuna/Dolphin Panel can be seen as extending this principle one step further,
by implicitly finding that the United States impermissibly transferred the
costs of its environmental protection policies to other states.
This principle has been asserted domestically under the dormant Com-
merce Clause in contexts involving the "tension" between liberalized trade
and environmental protection. Dormant Commerce Clause cases can thus
provide useful analytical tools for the international issues that are the focus
of this article. Indeed, international tribunals have looked to dormant
Commerce Clause cases that "deal] with controversies between States of
100. Helmut Steinberger, Sovereignty, in 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
408 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1987).
101. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). A
leading international law text explains: "The sovereignty and equality of states represent the
basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations, which governs a community consisting
primarily of states having a uniform legal personality." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCn'LES OF Ptmuc
INTERNAIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed. 1990).
102. One exception is the GATT provision permitting trade barriers "relating to the
products of prison labour." GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(e), 61 Stat. at A61, 55 U.N.T.S.
at 262.
103. See infra part III.B.3.
1424
CAN WE PROSPER AND PROTECT?
the Union ... concerning the quasi-sovereign rights of such States" for
guidance when resolving questions of international law.'
4
Although the Commerce Clause is, by its terms, an affirmative grant
of power to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, 05 the Supreme Court
has long interpreted the clause to limit the power of states to restrict or
prohibit interstate commerce. 1°6 In particular, courts have utilized the Com-
merce Clause to invalidate state measures that transfer the costs of envi-
ronmental protection to the citizens of other states or nations by discriminating
against products from that state or nation. °7
The U.S. Supreme Court applied this principle in Philadelphia v. New
Jersey'08 and Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt.'09 The underlying
dispute in the New Jersey case arose because that state was rapidly running
out of useable landfill space." 0 To conserve the existing space as long as
possible, the state legislature prohibited the importation of wastes generated
in other states for disposal in New Jersey."' This prohibition transferred to
the citizens of other states the costs of preserving New Jersey's scarce
landfill space, and the Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that
this conduct violated the dormant Commerce Clause." 2 By discriminating
against wastes generated in other states, New Jersey impermissibly "im-
pose[d] on out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving
the State's remaining landfill space.""' This transfer of costs violated other
states' sovereignty interests in determining for themselves what environmen-
tal costs to shoulder, and in avoiding the imposition of costs resulting from
a political process in which they did not participate." 4 A similar result is
104. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case, 3 United Nations Reports of International Arbitral
Awards [R.I.A.A.] 1905, 1964 (1941).
105. The Constitution provides that "[tihe Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce ... among the several States .... ." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 789, 800 (1992); Healy v. Beer Inst.,
Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 325 n.l (1989); New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
273-74 (1988); Raymond Motor Transp. Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978).
107. Of course, dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence reflects other values as well.
Some are similar to the values that underlie international trade law. For example, the Commerce
Clause, like trade law, is designed to further "liberalized" trade and thus economic efficiency.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) ("[T]his nation is a
common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw
materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand"). By
limiting the use of trade barriers, it is also intended to further political harmony among the
states. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979) (avoiding "economic
Balkanization" was "central concern" of Commerce Clause).
108. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
109. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
110. City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 625 (1978).
111. Id. at 618-19.
112. Id. at 626-27.
113. Id. at 628.
114. See National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Manage-
ment, 910 F.2d 713, 720 (lth Cir. 1990) (holding that Alabama statute which prohibits
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reached when states attempt to transfer the costs of environmental protection
to citizens of other nations by discriminating against trade in products from
those nations. "5
Moreover, the same result obtains when the state merely taxes, rather
than prohibits, the importation of wastes generated in other states. Hunt
involved a challenge to an Alabama statute that imposed differential fees
for the commercial disposal of in-state and out-of-state hazardous waste."1
6
Applying the principles articulated in New Jersey, the Court concluded that
these differential fees were a form of "economic protectionism barred by
the Commerce Clause." 
7
3. The Political Harmony Interest
A third, related interest is also served by the international trade regime.
This is the interest in political harmony. The argument is that the elimination
of trade restrictions creates economic interdependence and economic inte-
gration. Interdependence in turn promotes political cooperation. As Mon-
tesquieu summarized this argument, "peace is the natural effect of trade.""'
In contrast, trade barriers can lead to distrust and retaliation, and trade
wars can be a contributing cause of military wars.' 9
This political harmony argument has ancient roots. Aristophanes argued
that a decree Pericles issued restricting entry of products from Megara
played a major role in the start of the Peloponnesian War. 20 More recently,
importation of hazardous wastes generated in other states, unless these states met certain
statutory requirements, violates dormant Commerce Clause as it "imposes on these generators
the burden of conserving Alabama's remaining hazardous waste disposal capacity"); Govern-
ment Suppliers Consolidating Serv. v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739 (S.D. Ind. 1990) (holding that
state statute that effectively bans importation of solid wastes from other states violates dormant
Commerce Clause).
115. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 770 F. Supp. 1142 (M.D.
La. 1991) (holding that Louisiana statute prohibiting importation of hazardous waste generated
in foreign countries violates Commerce Clause).
116. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992). The Act imposed a
"base fee" of $25.60 per ton on all hazardous waste, and an "additional fee" of $72.00 per
ton on all waste "generated outside of Alabama." Id. at 2012.
117. Id. at 2013.
118. ROBERT GILPEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 56 (1987)
(quoting Montesquieu). John Stuart Mill similarly observed that international trade was "the
principal guarantee of the peace of the world." JOHN STUART MILL, Principles of Political
Economy, in III COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 594 (John M. Robson ed., 1965).
A fuller development of this argument in the post-World War II context can be found
in DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 206-10 (1985); JOHN L. GADDIs, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR 1941-1947, at 18-23 (1972).
119. See J.B. CONDLIFFE, THE COMMERCE OF NATIONS 527 (1950). This argument is critically
evaluated in GILPEN, supra note 118, at 56-58.
120. See BARRY E. CARTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAP-
HAZARD U.S. LEGAL REGIME 8 n.2 (1988); see also PLUTARCH, THE RISE AND FALL OF ATHENS
195-96 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., 1960); THUCYDIDES, HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 73
(Rex Warner trans., 1954).
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the idea that liberalized trade enhances political harmony has played a
prominent role in the development of the European Community.
In the aftermath of World War II, European leaders thought that the
trade wars of the 1920s and 1930s-and resulting political friction-were
partial causes of the war.' 21 Many leaders believed that European unity was
essential to preserve peace, and that a liberalized trade regime would promote
this unity.1'2 The initial French proposal for the formation of the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), known as the Schuman Declaration,'2
stated that France has long "champion[ed a] united Europe ... in the
service of peace." However, "a united Europe was not achieved, and we
had war."' 24 The proposal continued:
The gathering of the nations of Europe requires the elimination of
the ageold opposition of France and the Federal Republic of
Germany.... With this aim in view, the French Government ...
proposes to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under
a common "High Authority". . . . The solidarity in production thus
established will make it plain that any war between France and the
Federal Republic of Germany becomes not only unthinkable, but
materially impossible.1'
That economic integration was designed not only to make war "materially
impossible," but also to advance political harmony was explicit: "The
pooling of coal and steel production [is contemplated as] a first step in the
federation of Europe ....126
The preamble to the ECSC Treaty incorporated much of the language
quoted above and stated the expectation of the ECSC parties that "by
121. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 10, 31 (1989). Contem-
porary writers make the same point. See, e.g., C. FRED BERGSON, MANAGING INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 4 (1977); HARRY SHUTT, THE MYTH OF FREE TRADE 12 (1985);
Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., Beyond Laissez Faire, 87 FOREIGN POL'Y 67 (1992).
122. The U.S. government took a similar view. Cordell Hull, who was Secretary of State
from 1933 to 1944, strongly believed that liberalized trade was "the spear point of peace."
CORDELL HULL, THE MEMOIRS OF CORDELL HuLL 525 (1948). Official State Department
documents adopted this position. A 1944 State Department declaration stated: "Trade conflict
breeds noncooperation, suspicion, bitterness. Nations which are economic enemies are not
likely to remain political friends for long." JACKSON, supra note 121, at 10. A 1945 Presidential
message said: "The fundamental choice is whether countries will struggle against each other
for wealth and power, or work together for security and mutual advantage .... The experience
of cooperation in the task of earning a living promotes both the habit and the techniques of
common effort and helps make permanent the mutual confidence on which the peace depends."
Id.
123. Robert Schuman was Foreign Minister of France at the time France first proposed
the ECSC. Many scholars believe that the declaration was drafted by the French Economic
Planning Commission, headed by Jean Monnet. STEPHEN GEORGE, POLICS AND POLICY IN
THE EUROPEAN CommunITEs 1 (3d ed. 1991).
124. Schuman Declaration, May 9, 1950, reprinted in Thirty Years Ago: The Schuman
Declaration, 13 BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES No. 5, at 14-15 (1980).
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
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establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper
community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts" could be
formed. 27 The "economic community" formed by this treaty incorporated
many of the rules associated with liberal trade regimes, including prohibi-
tions on (1) import and export duties, (2) means and practices discriminating
against certain producers or consumers and (3) government subsidies.
2
1
The ECSC is a direct precursor of today's European Community (EC), 
2 9
which likewise rests, in part, on the notion that economic integration serves
political harmony. The preamble to the Treaty of Rome, establishing the
EC, memorializes the parties' determination "to lay the foundations of an
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."' 30 One of the primary
mechanisms to advance these goals is the creation of a "common market"
among the EC Member States. This common market is ensured by prohi-
bitions on restrictions on the free flow of goods, services, people and capital
among Member States. In this way, the EC seeks to use liberalized trade
as a means of promoting political harmony.
Although limitations on the use of trade restrictions no doubt serve
other important interests as well, the three discussed above-economic
efficiency, respect for sovereignty, and political harmony-are probably the
most prominent, and have been used to strike trade restrictions intended to
preserve environmental resources.
B. Environmental Interests
As mentioned above, the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report failed to consider
the environmental interests served by the MMPA. For this reason, the
Panel's analysis obscures, rather than illuminates, the relative weight of the
conflicting values at stake in the tuna/dolphin dispute. Analysis of future
conflicts between the interests in liberalized trade and in protecting the
global commons will need to take account of all relevant international
interests. Of course, different green trade barriers will be designed to protect
different environmental interests. However, it is instructive to outline briefly
the interests served by recent efforts to protect global commons resources.
1. Atmosphere
The earth's upper atmosphere is outside the jurisdiction of any single
nation or group of nations, and hence is a global commons resource. Recent
127. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261
U.N.T.S. 143.
128. Id. at 147.
129. Formally, there are three European Communities: the ECSC, the European Atomic
Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community. Each has the same
members, and in 1965 the Member States reached agreement to merge the institutions of the
three Communities. This agreement took effect in 1967, and collectively they are now commonly
called 'the European Community.' See GEORGE, supra note 123, at 1.
130. Treaty of Rome, supra note 14, pmbl., at 14. The recent treaties signed at Maastricht
are designed to further economic integration and political union. Treaty on European Union,
Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247. A good summary of the Maastricht treaty is found in The Deal
Is Done, ECoNoMisT, Dec. 14, 1991, at 51.
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international efforts to preserve this resource have focused on the problems
of ozone depletion and global warming. Ozone is a trace gas that limits the
amount of solar ultraviolet (UV) radiation reaching the earth. It is primarily
found at altitudes of between twelve and twenty-five kilometers above the
earth's surface.' During the 1970s and 1980si researchers learned that a
variety of anthropogenic chemicals destroy the ozone in the earth's strato-
sphere. As a result of this thinning of the ozone layer, more UV radiation
passes to the earth's surface.
The unchecked depletion of the earth's ozone layer and resulting increase
in UV radiation reaching the earth's surface pose a number of risks to
human health and the natural environment. Perhaps the most serious threat
is that of increased skin cancer due to increased exposure to UV radiation.
It is' estimated that "a one percent decline in the ozone level may increase
UV radiation by two percent and cause 200,000 more skin cancer cases"
worldwide.3 2 In addition:
retinal eye damage, cataracts, and eventual blindness can be caused
by insufficient protection from the sun's damaging rays by the
ozone layer. Additional effects caused by a reduction in the ozone
layer include alteration of the immune system through damaged
immune cells, lowered resistance to infections, neurological damage,
and the destruction of zooplankton, a key link in the food chain.
Lower yields and stunted growth of crops are other serious possible
consequences of the destruction of the ozone layer.'
In response to the developing understanding of the processes leading to
ozone depletion-and the nature and magnitude of the threats posed by
ozone depletion-nations took unilateral acts34 and entered into a series of
multilateral treaties that control and limit the use of ozone-depleting chem-
icals. 3s These treaties, inter alia, call for phasing out.the use of certain
ozone-depleting chemicals and, in the meantime, limit international trade in
such chemicals.
Another environmental threat involving the atmosphere is that of "global
warming." The earth reflects approximately thirty percent of the solar
radiation directed towards it into outer space. The remaining seventy percent
131. CYNTHIA SHEA, PROTECTING LIF ON EARTH: STEPS TO SAVE THE OZONE LAYER 5
(1988); Daniel L. Albritton, Stratospheric Ozone Depletion: Global Processes, in OZONE
DEPLETION, GREENHOUSE GASEs, AND CLWATE CHANGE 10, 11 (1989).
132. Christine B. Davidson, Note, The Montreal Protocol: The First Step Toward Pro-
tecting the Global Ozone Layer, 20 N.Y.U. J., INT'L L. & POL. 793, 807 (1988) (citations
omitted).
133. Id. at 808 (citations omitted); see also Douglas M. Ogden, Note, The Montreal
Protocol: Confronting the Threat to Earth's Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L. REv. 997, 998-99
(1988).
134. For example, this country banned the use of CFCs, which contain ozone-depleting
chemicals, in nonessential aerosol spray cans. See 40 C.F.R. Ch. 1 (1986).
135. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M.
1529; Montreal Protocol, supra note 8; London Amendments, supra note 52.
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is absorbed and reemitted outward as long-wave radiation. Certain gasses
and particles in the atmosphere permit incoming radiation, but absorb the
outgoing long-wave radiation. The greater the buildup of these "greenhouse
gases" the higher the mean global temperature of the earth's surface.
36
Little doubt exists that emissions resulting from human activities have
substantially increased the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases,
particularly carbon dioxide. 3 7 However, there is significant- scientific debate
over the nature, magnitude, and possible consequences of these increased
concentrations. Scientists have developed a variety of computer models,
based on different scientific assumptions and various predictions of future
greenhouse gas emissions, and produced a number of possible models of
the effects of climate change. Although there seems to be "some movement
away from the more apocalyptic scenarios,"' 8 it is clear that the possibility
of significant climate change threatens dramatic consequences for mankind.
For example, some scenarios suggest that global warming can cause sea
levels to rise due to thermal expinsion of the oceans and melting of polar
ice caps. These rising oceans could flood or submerge significant parts of
various nations, threatening the nearly fifty percent of the world's popu-
lation living on or near a coastline. 3 9 In addition to the permanent inun-
dation of lowlands and increased flooding, rising sea levels could cause
accelerated erosion, increased salinity of freshwater sources and threats to
man-made structures. 40 Climate change also threatens to disrupt global food
production.'
4'
To address these threats, no fewer than 155 nations signed a climate
change treaty at the United Nations Conference on Environment and De-
136. This brief description of global warming is adopted from a more complete account
of the greenhouse phenomena found in JOSHUA EPSTEIN & RAj GUPTA, CONTROLLING THE
GREENHOUSE EFFECT 1 (1990).
137. See CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC SCmNTIFIC ASSESSMENT 8-18 (J.T. Houghton et al.
eds., 1990). It appears that the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is approx-
imately 25% higher than it was 100 years ago. Stephen Schneider & Norman Rosenberg, The
Greenhouse Effect: Its Causes, Possible Impacts, and Associated Uncertainties, in GREENHOUSE
WARMING: ABATEMENT AND ADAPTATION 19 (Norman J. Rosenberg et al. eds., 1989).
138. Andrew R. Solow, Is There A Global Warming Problem?, in GLOBAL WARMING,
ECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSES 7, 25 (Rudiger Dornbusch & James M. Poterba eds., 1991); see
also Robert C. Cowen, Global Warming Study Remains Educated Guess, CHRISTIAN Sci.
MONITOR, June 9, 1992, at 8; Estimates of Global Warming May be Exaggerated, IPCC Says,
15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 35 (Jan. 29, 1992).
139. See STEPHEN H. SCHNEIDER, GLOBAL WARMING (1989); Jodi L. Jacobson, Holding
Back the Sea, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1990, at 79-97 (Lester R. Brown et al. eds., 1990);
David Wirth, Climate Chaos, 74 FOREIGN POL'Y 3, 9 (1989).
140. Noel Brown, Global Change and Global Warming: Framing the Issues, 1 CoLo. J.
INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 11, 14 (1990); James G. Titus, Greenhouse Effect, Sea Level Rise
and Barrier Islands: Case Study of Long Beach Island, New Jersey, 18 COASTAL MGMT. 65,
66-67 (1990).
141. See THE IMPACT OF CLIMATIC VARIATIONS ON AGRICULTURE (M.L. Parry et al. eds.,
1988).
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velopment (UNCED) in Brazil in June, 1992.142 This treaty sets guidelines
for cutting national emissions of greenhouse gases. It provides that developed
nations shall aim to return "individually or jointly to their 1990 levels of
.. anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases"
by the end of this decade. 43 The treaty will enter into force after it has
been ratified by fifty signatories. 144 At some point, nations will likely utilize
economic or market based incentives to further the goal of reducing the
greenhouse gas emissions.' 4"
2. Biodiversity
Biodiversity is an umbrella term for the degree of nature's variety,
including ecosystem diversity, species diversity and genetic diversity.'" Bi-
ological resources provide the essential materials for life on the planet.
47
These resources provide for humanity's food, shelter, clothing, medicine
and other needs. In addition, they provide indirect benefits such as watershed
protection, production of soil, photosynthesis and climate regulation.'"
However, human activities "are reducing biological diversity at a rate that
may be unprecedented in the history of life" on this planet. 49
Much of this diversity is being lost through extinction caused by loss
of natural habitats, especially in the tropics.10 Moreover, much of the loss
in these areas is due to massive deforestation. Although tropical forests
cover approximately seven percent of the earth's land surface, they contain
at least fifty percent-and perhaps up to ninety percent-of the world's
species."' These tropical forests are being destroyed at a rate of 20-25
million hectares every year.' 52 If present trends of habitat destruction caused
142. 155 Nations Sign Climate Change Treaty, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 421
(June 17, 1992).
143. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 4(2)(b), 31 I.L.M. 849.
144. Reilly Says U.S. Will Accelerate Scheme to Address Climate Change, 15 Int'l Env't
Rep. (BNA) No. 12; at 422 (June 17, 1992).
145. For example, the European Community has considered the imposition of a "carbon
tax." EC Environment Ministers Agree on Idea of New Energy Tax to Address Climate
Change, 14 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 21, at 562 (Oct. 23, 1991). A U.N. report has
advocated creation of a global market in carbon emission permits. U.N Agency Proposes
Global Pollution Trading System to Control Global Warming, 15 Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) No.
3, at 61 (Feb. 12, 1992).
146. JEFFREY McNEELY ET AL., CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIoLoGIcAL DIVERSITY 17 (1990).
147. Id. at 25.
148. Id. at 27.
149. GEORGE LEDEC & ROBERT GOODLAND, WILDLANDS: THEIR PROTECTION AND MANAGE-
MENT IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 7 (1988).
150. EDWARD 0. WILSON, BIODIVERsITy 3 (1988).
151. Kenton R. Miller et al., Deforestation and Species Loss, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT 78, 83 (Jessica T. Mathews ed., 1991).
152. Id. at 82; see also The State of the Environment 1985, U.N. Environment Programme,
at 30-32, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.13/4 (1985) (noting that rate of deforestation is approximately
15 million hectares per year). A hectare is approximately 2.43 acres.
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by this rate of deforestation continue, between five and fifteen percent of
the world's species could become extinct in the next thirty years.'
This process represents an unprecedented raid on the planet's biological
wealth. Many species of wild plants and animals are undeveloped resources
and can potentially be used to improve agriculture, forestry and ranching.
They are important to industry as sources of tannins, resins, gums, oils,
dyes, and other commercially useful products . 54 The potential for new
industrial products is significant, but impossible to quantify; indeed, just
over one hundred years ago, "even the rubber tree was just another
Amazonian tree species of unknown economic value."'55
Biological resources are also important for modern medicine. At least
forty percent of all prescriptions written in this country contain drugs that
originate from wild species. 56 The recent discovery of anticarcinogenic
properties in taxol, which is found in the bark of the yew tree, illustrates
the untapped medicinal potential of wild plants and animals.
5 7
Nations have recognized the myriad values associated with biodiversity
and have entered into a number of conventions to preserve habitat, flora
and fauna.' The overwhelming majority of the world's nations signed a
biological diversity treaty at the UNCED conference. This treaty requires
national inventories of plants and wildlife, as well as plans to protect
endangered species. 59 It also provides for a system to compensate developing
nations whose biological resources are used in developing new drugs, prod-
ucts and other biotechnologies.Iw
Other than the UNCED treaty, perhaps the most prominent international
attempt to protect biodiversity is the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES).' 6' This treaty prohibits commercial trade in
153. Miller et al., supra note 151, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note
151, at 84.
154. LEDEC & GOODLAND, supra note 149, at 12.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Jessica Mathews, The Medicine No One Knew Was There, WASH. PosT,
June 17, 1991, at A9.
158. See, e.g., Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Water-
fowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245; African Convention on the Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources, Sept. 15, 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3; ASEAN Agreement on the
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, July 9, 1985, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT (Second series) 41 (Bernd Rister & Bruno Simma eds.,
1992) [hereinafter ASEAN].
159. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 7, 8(k), annex I, 31 I.L.M.. 818.
160. The United States did not sign the biodiversity treaty, arguing that it would weaken
patent protection for U.S. biotechnology companies, and thus discourage future research and
development. Steven Greenhouse, A Closer Look: Ecology, the Economy and Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 1992, § 4, at 1; Michael Weisskopf & Ann Devroy, World Leaders Set Course
for Protecting the Earth, WASH. PosT, June 13, 1992, at Al.
161. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES].
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species threatened with extinction. 62 It also regulates trade in listed species
with nonparty states.1
63
3. The Duty Not to Harm the Global Commons
Once lost, the global commons resources discussed above, as well as
many others, are all but impossible to recover. Our understanding of these
dangers is still evolving. However, even now, it is clear that nations have
a vital interest in environmental resources-and practices-beyond their
borders.
The field of international environmental law recognizes the interests
nations have in the preservation of global commons resources. In this
developing field, nations have the duty to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction, including the global commons.
This duty finds root in several international decisions. For example, in
the Corfu Channel case,' 6 ' the International Court of Justice declared as a
general and well-recognized principle "every State's obligation not to allow
knowingly its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other states.' ' 65
In this case, the Court held that Albania was responsible for damage caused
when British warships struck Albanian mines placed in the North Corfu
Channel. Scholars have seized upon the language quoted above as estab-
lishing a principle of state responsibility for transfrontier pollution.'
66
Similarly, in the Lac Lanoux arbitration, 167 an international arbitral
tribunal held that states cannot exercise their sovereign rights in a manner
that ignores the rights of other states. In this case, France proposed to
divert water from the Carol River, which flows from France into Spain.
Spain argued that this diversion violated customary international law (droit
international commun), as well as treaties between it and France. The
arbitrators apparently accepted the principle that it is unlawful to change
the condition of a river to the serious injury of a downstream state without
taking account of the rights and interests of that state.
6
.These principles have been applied in international environmental dis-
putes. For example, in the celebrated Trail Smelter case, 69 the United States
initiated international arbitration against Canada in response to damage
caused when sulfuric and other fumes from a smelter in British Columbia
162. Id. art. III, 27 U.S.T. at 1093-95, 993 U.N.T.S. at 246-47.
163. Id. art. X, 27 U.S.T. at 1104, 993 U.N.T.S. at 251.
164. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9).
165. Id. at 22.
166. See, e.g., JAMEs BARROS & DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION 75 (1974); Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 1484, 1497 n.31 (1991).
167. Lake Lanoux (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957).
168. Id. Nevertheless, France's efforts to make full restitution to the river were such that
France's acts did not constitute a violation of international law. Id.
"169. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941).
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drifted over the border into Washington state and caused property damage.
After reviewing decisions involving air and water pollution, the panel
declared that:
[U]nder the principles of international law ... no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as
to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of serious conse-
quence and the injury is established by clear and convincing evi-
dence. 7
0
Australia relied upon this principle in the Nuclear Tests case.' 7' In that
action, Australia and other Pacific nations argued that they would suffer
the effects of radioactive fallout resulting from France's nuclear testing.
Significantly, they also argued that the tests violated international law
because they caused pollution of the global commons. 72 In response to
Australia's application for provisional relief, the International Court of
Justice entered an interim order instructing France to desist from testing
that would deposit fallout on Australian territory.
7
1
There can be little doubt that the Trail Smelter rule is a generally
accepted principle of international law. 74 The obligation not to harm the
environment outside a nation's borders has received expression in a number
of United Nations resolutions and treaties. The Stockholm Declaration,
issued at the 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, provides
that "States have ... the responsibility to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction."'' 75 The U.N.
General Assembly has declared that this principle is one of the fundamental
rules governing the international obligations of states with respect to the
environment, 76 and it has been incorporated into the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States177 and any number of international environmental
treaties.
78
170. Id. at 1965.
171. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20).
172. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 99, 103-04 (Interim Order of June 27,
1973).
173. Id. at 106. Thereafter, the ICJ ruled that France's unilateral public declarations to
cease testing rendered the Pacific nations' claims moot. Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 457, 472-78 (Dec. 20). A criticism of the Court's reliance on France's pledges is found
in Alfred Rubin, The International Legal-Effects of Unilateral Declarations, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 1 (1977).
174. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 601 (1987); REPORT
OF THE SIXTEENTH CONFERENCE 163 (Int'l Law Comm'n) (collecting citations).
175. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6, Principle 21, at 1420.
176. International Responsibility of States in Regard to the Environment, G.A. Res. 2996,
U.N. GAOR 27th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 42-43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972).
177. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 6.
178. See, e.g., ASEAN, supra note 158, art. 20(1), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
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This well-established duty not to harm areas outside national jurisdiction
is supplemented by international treaties and declarations imposing obliga-
tions on nations to enact measures to preserve the global commons. For
example, the Montreal Protocol requires states to reduce their consumption
of chemicals that destroy the ozone layer. 7 9 Several treaties oblige nations
to take steps to protect marine life and to prohibit the pollution of the
marine environment.180 Parties to the Ramsar wetlands convention'' argu-
ably have obligations to promote the conservation of protected wetlands
located in other countries. 82 The International. Convention on Oil Pollution
Preparedness, Response and Cooperation8 3 requires parties to provide ad-
vice, technical support and equipment in the event of serious oil spills in
the high seas.
Significantly, in a number of international environmental treaties, the
measures authorized to protect the global commons are green trade barri-
ers. ' For example, the Montreal Protocol expressly requires trade measures
OF THE ENVIRONMENT at 54; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, May
2, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 1, 1982,
art. 194(2), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1308 [hereinafter UNCLOS
III].
This principle also appears in treaties outside the strictly environmental context. For
example, the Helsinki Final Act provides that "each of the participating States in accordance
with the principles of international law, ought to ensure ... that activities carried out on its
territory do not cause degradation of the environment in another State or in areas lying beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final
Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1307. Similarly, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty prohibits
nuclear explosions in global commons areas such as the atmosphere, the oceans, and outer
space, as well as in "any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be
present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such
explosion is conducted." Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer
Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, art. I(b), 14 U.S.T. 1313.
179. Montreal Protocol, supra note 8.
180. See, e.g., UNCLOS III, supra note 178, art. 192, at 1308; Convention for the
Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-Based Sources, June 4, 1974, 13 I.L.M. 352;
Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16, 1976,
1102 U.N.T.S. 45.
181. Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Hab-
itat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245.
182. See SIMON LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 195 (1985) (suggesting that parties'
obligations "extend to all listed sites irrespective of where they are situated").
183. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,
Nov. 30, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 733.
184. In addition to the treaties discussed infra, multilateral treaties with trade provisions
include: Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in their Natural State,
Nov. 8, 1933, 172 L.N.T.S. 242; Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation
in the Western Hemisphere, Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161 U.N.T.S. 193; International
Convention For the Protection of Birds, Oct. 18, 1950, 638 U.N.T.S. 186; International Plant
Protection Convention, Dec. 6, 1951, 150 U.N.T.S. 68; Convention on Conservation of North
Pacific Fur Seals, Feb. 9, 1957, 314 U.N.T.S. 106; Agreement Concerning Co-operation in
the Quarantine of Plants and Their Protection against Pests and Diseases, Dec. 14, 1959, 422
U.N.T.S. 34; Benelux Convention on the Hunting and Protection of Birds, June 10, 1970,
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to -protect the atmosphere by requiring states to prohibit the import and
export of ozone-depleting chemicals from and to nations that have not
signed the treaty.
8 5
Similarly, treaties designed to protect and conserve flora and fauna
utilize trade restriction to encourage other states to join these treaties and
to further the ends of the treaties. For example, CITES requires states to
impose trade barriers to protect animals and plants outside its borders.8 6
The Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the
Western Hemisphere obligates states to regulate trade in certain species of
fauna and flora. 8 7 The African Conservation Convention' is designed to
conserve plant and animal resources and requires all contracting parties to
prevent trade in flora or fauna that have been illegally captured, killed or
obtained within the territory of another party.
Similar green trade barriers are found in treaties that address interna-
tional trade in hazardous waste. For example, under the Basel Convention,
"[a] Party shall not permit hazardous wastes or other wastes to be exported
to a non-Party or to be imported from a non-Party."'8 19 Under the auspices
of the Organization of African Unity, a number of African nations have
entered into a treaty banning the importation of hazardous wastes into
Africa from a noncontracting party.' 90
There are strong policy and political arguments supporting the use of
trade measures to protect the global commons, and it is likely that the use
of such measures will continue. Such measures are one way of addressing
many of the "collective action" problems associated with multilateral ef-
forts. '1 Nations that take action to preserve global commons resources
pursuant to an environmental treaty create a "public good" from which
reprinted in 5 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2127 (Bernd Rilster & Bruno
Simma eds., 1975). The Rio Declaration, signed at the Earth Summit, discourages but does
not prohibit the unilateral use of green trade barriers. Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, June 14, 1992, Principle 12, 31 I.L.M. 874, 878.
185. Montreal Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 4, 10, at 1554-55, 1557.
186. CITES, supra note 161.
187. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemi-
sphere, Oct. 12, 1940, art. IX, 56 Stat. 1254, 161 U.N.T.S. 193.
188. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Sept.
15, 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3.
189. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of-Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal, Mar. 27, 1989, art. 4(5), U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.80-3 (1989), 28 I.L.M.
657. To the extent this treaty reflects concerns that the improper handling, transportation or
disposal of hazardous wastes threatens to pollute the atmosphere or oceans, this treaty seeks
to protect global commons resources.
190. Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the Control of
Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within Africa, Jan. 29,
1991, 30 I.L.M. 773.
191. Collective action problems arise when individual parties can, without taking any
actions that impose costs on themselves, enjoy the benefits created by the collective efforts of
other parties. See generally RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION (1982); MANCUR OLSEN, THE
LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (2d ed. 1971).
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they cannot exclude noncooperating states. Imposing trade restraints against
"free riders"-nations that have not joined the treaty-is one way of
minimizing or eliminating the benefits enjoyed by nonparties, and of thereby
encouraging the nonparties to join the treaty regime.
In addition, the industries of nations that assume certain costs to protect
the environment as a result of national treaty obligations may find them-
selves at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis their competitors in other
nations that have not assumed the same obligations. Trade measures can
seek to eliminate this comparative advantage.
In other circumstances, action by a group of states may be rendered
ineffective if other nations do not cooperate. For example, if a number of
countries agree to halt commercial whaling in the high seas, their efforts
will be undermined if one or more major whaling nations continues to hunt
whales to the point of extinction.192 Sirmilarly, the efforts of a nation or
group of nations to reduce their output of greenhouse gases can be rendered
ineffective if these reductions are "replaced" by increased emissions from
other nations. Trade measures are one means of "encouraging" reluctant
states to join an international environmental regime, and thus increase the
possibility that the regime's goals will be met.
Finally, a nation may properly decide that it does not wish to "aid and
abet" the harmful environmental practices of another nation. Countries
should be under no obligation to provide markets for products whose use
or production contributes to the destruction of ,a global commons resource.
In particular, nations should be permitted to refuse local complicity in the
destruction of wildlife or other resources located outside its borders. The
contrary position-requiring nations to provide markets for products pro-
duced in environmentally destructive ways-arguably forces those states to
violate their responsibility to ensure that "activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment ... beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction."' 93 The international trade regime should not ob-
ligate nations to violate the duties imposed by international environmental
law.
The principle that one state need not aid and abet the environmentally
harmful acts by persons in other states has been endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court in an analogous domestic context. Thus, the authority
of states to establish local prohibitions with respect to out-of-state wildlife
has long been upheld by the courts.'9 In particular, prohibiting the import
192. Although the International .Whaling Commission has imposed a moratorium on
commercial whaling, Norway recently announced that it will resume commercial whaling
activities next year, and Iceland has announced plans to withdraw from the Commission.
Glenn Frankel, Norway, Iceland Defy Ban, Will Resume Whale Hunts, WASH. POST, June 30,
1992, at A14; Craig Whitney, Norway is Planning to Resume Whaling Despite World Ban,
N.Y. TImEs, June 30, 1992, at Al.
193. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 6, Principle 21, at 1420.
194. See, e.g., New York ex reL. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 41-43 (1908).
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or sale of wildlife to protect out-of-state animals is a legitimate state interest
and does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause.' 95
These arguments in favor of the use of green trade barriers are buttressed
by the fact that, as a practical matter, nations have few other means of
encouraging other states to protect global commons resources. Less coercive
measures, such as diplomatic pressure, generally are insufficient to persuade
nations to change their environmental practices. Moreover, nations are
understandably reluctant to employ more coercive measures, such as the
threat or use of force, against another country simply because it trades in
an endangered plant or an ozone-depleting chemical.196 In addition, for
better or worse, powerful domestic constituencies often support the use of
trade barriers against the products of foreign competitors. This conjunction
of domestic and international political realities makes tride measures to
protect the global commons an increasingly attractive policy tool.1
97
IV. LmuTINO PRINCIPLES
The tuna/dolphin dispute illustrates one way in which "[e]cology and
economy are becoming ever more interwoven-locally, regionally, nationally,
and globally-into a seamless web of cause and effects."' 98 This dispute
forced the realization that differing environmental rules in different nations
significantly affects world trade-and that the international community lacks
meaningful rules for constraining these effects. The relationship between
international trade and the environment is extremely complex. One nation
may view another nation's vigorous environmental protection policy as an
unjustified barrier to trade. Conversely, producers in states with strict
environmental regulations may be concerned that foreign competitors op-
erating under more lax environmental regimes enjoy comparative advantages.
Indeed, differences in environmental regulations may, in part, prompt
industries or plants to relocate. 99 Finally, some argue that the failure to
impose strict environmental regulations constitutes an implicit governmental
subsidy to industry.2°°
195. See, e.g., Cresenzi Bird Importers, Inc. v. New York, 658 F. Supp. 1441 (S.D.N.Y.
1987); Palladio Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d
1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); A.E. Nettleton Co. v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d
118, 123-24 (N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 969 (197.0).
196. See CAIRNCROSS, supra note 4, at 152.
197. A review of recent legislative activity illustrates this point. In the 101st Congress,
there were at least 33 environmental bills introduced that would either restrict international
trade or affect trade policy. In each of these bills, import or export restrictions would be used
to achieve environmental goals. See U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3. A summary of
bills introduced in the 102d Congress related to the trade and environment issue is found in
OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 91-92.
198. WCED, supra note 1, at 5.
199. H. JEFFREY LEONARD, POLUnON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE WORLD PRODUCT 64-
74 (1988); OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 59, 97-100; Hilary French, A Most Deadly Trade,
WORLD WATCH, July-Aug. 1990, at 11.
200. Legislation was recently introduced in the United States Senate which would permit
the imposition of duties on imports produced under environmental standards less strict than
those in this country. S. 984, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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Just as environmental policies have effects on trade, trade policies can
channel economic behavior in environmentally benign or destructive direc-
tions. 201 Trade regimes formed by commodity -agreements and preferential
trade agreements can promote environmentally unsound activities. For ex-
ample, the Multi-Fiber Arrangement 2°2 severely reduces developing nation
exports of textiles and other products made from fibers. The agreement
creates incentives for developing nations to substitute resource intensive
ecdnomic activities-such as timber exports-for a more environmentally
benign fiber-based industry.2°a
Similarly, tariff and subsidy policies can have environmentally destruc-
tive effects. For example, many developed nations utilize "tariff escala-
tion"-the imposition of greater duties on finished goods than on raw
materials. 204 This practice encourages the increased export of natural re-
sources from developing nations and discourages the use of local manufac-
turing and production facilities. Developed nations also encourage agricultural
production through subsidized water and energy prices. This encourages
overproduction in developed nations and decreases export markets for
developing nations. As a result, small-scale farming in developing nations
is discouraged, and economic behavior is shifted to activities that are more
harmful to the environment. 205 Developing nations have used government
subsidies in environmentally destructive ways as well. Many tropical nations
with large forest resources have provoked unsustainable timber harvests
through taxes and other subsidies. 206
Import and export controls can have environmental effects.' As the
tuna/dolphin dispute illustrates, nations can use import controls to attempt
to affect the environmental practices of other nations. In addition, export
controls in. industrialized nations can inhibit the transfer of environmental
technologies and services to developing nations.20 7 A lack of controls likewise
201. See, e.g., OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 38-42; System-Wide Medium-Term Envi-
ronment Programme for the Period 1990-1995, U.N. Environment Programme, at 83-89, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/GCSS.I/7 (1988).
202. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20; 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001. This agreement is ably described in Ram Khanna, Market Sharing Under Multifiber
Arrangement: Consequences of Non-Tariff Barriers in the Textile Trade, J. WORLD TRADE L.,
Feb. 1990, at 71.
203. Tom H. Tietenberg, Managing the Transition, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRON-
MENT, supra note 151, at 187, 200; WCED, supra note 1, at 154.
204. WCED, supra note 1, at 81-82.
205. Teitenberg, supra note 203, in PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, supra note
151, at 199-200; WCED, supra note 1, at 122-23; J. Hugh Faulkner, Toward Simultaneously
Achieving Economic Growth and Improving the Global Environment, 2 INT'L ENVTL. Asp.
287, 290 (1990).
206. WCED, supra note 1, at 153-54; OTA REPORT, supra note 4, at 41-42.
207. In recognition of this issue, the United Nations Environment Programme has called
upon "[g]overnments to promote the commercial exchange and transfer of environmental
protection technology, and direct industrial contacts in the field of environmental protection
technology." U.N. GAOR 42nd Sess., Supp. No. 25, at 67, U.N. Doc. A/42/25 (1987). See
generally WCED, supra note 1, at 87-88.
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has environmental consequences. International trade is the mechanism whereby
toxic wastes and other dangerous products are transferred from one nation
to another.208 Trade liberalization can increase production and other forms
of economic activity in contexts where adequate environmental safeguards
are lacking.
Finally, the attempts by developing nations to meet international debt
obligations may lead to environmentally destructive economic activities.
Many of these nations are forced to utilize a substantial portion of their
export earnings to service foreign debt. 2°9 The diversion of resources from
the poorer countries to the richer nations to service this debt "has taken a
toll not only on the people of developing lands, but on the land itself.
Forests have been recklessly logged, mineral deposits carelessly mined, and
fisheries overexploited, all to pay foreign creditors. '210 Clearly, the present
level of debt service of many poorer countries is inconsistent with sustainable
development.
21'
At present, the international trade and environmental regimes are on a
collision course. The world community needs a conceptual framework that
will enable it to reconcile the various international interests at stake in the
conflict between the environment and trade. This framework should include
principles that permit a harmonization of the use of trade measures to
protect the global commons with the strong interest in liberalized trade. In
particular, the framework should both permit and constrain the use of green
trade barriers.2 1 2 It should also ensure that these barriers are not used to
close markets to developing nations, to avoid what some call "ecoimperi-
alism.' '213
208. WCED, supra note 1, at 226-28.
209. In 1987, 57% of the Gross Domestic Product of Africa was used to service debt.
U.N. DEP'T OF INT'L ECONOMICS & SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SURVEY OF
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 1988, at 4, U.N.Doc. ST/ESCAP/678, U.N. Sales No. E.89.1I.F.3
(1988). In Latin America, the figure was 46.8%. Id.
210. Alan B. Durning, Ending Poverty, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1990, supra note 139,
at 135, 140.
211. WCED, supra note 1, at 18, 74-5.
212. The International Court of Justice has made clear that not all forms of economic
sanctions violate customary international law. In its case against the United States, Nicaragua
complained that the United States had violated international law by imposing a total trade
embargo. Although the Court ruled that other U.S. acts against Nicaragua violated international
law, it refused to hold that the economic sanctions were violative of international law. Military
and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27). Indeed, as state
practice demonstrates, the use of economic sanctions for political ends is widespread. See,
e.g., GARY HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN POLICY
GOALS 14-22 (1983) (providing lengthy and nonexhaustive list of use of economic sanctions in
20th century).
213. Many people fear that the environmental regulations of industrialized nations are a
mechanism to perpetuate their economic advantage vis-a-vis the developing world. See, e.g.,
William Aron, The Commons Revisited: Thoughts on Marine Mammal Management, 16
COASTAL MamT. 99, 108 (noting that extraterritorial reach of U.S. environmental laws creates
perception that United States "is trying to press its moral and ethical standards on others");
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A. Description of the Limiting Principles
Application of a number of principles can properly limit the use of
green trade barriers. A legal test that properly balances the interest in
liberalized trade with the interest in preserving the global commons would
examine: the type and strength of the interest being protected, whether the
trade barrier discriminates between foreign nations or between foreign and
domestic products, and, finally, whether the trade restriction is related to
and proportionate to the environmental goal.
214
1. Type of Interest
First, the nature of the interest being protected must be identified. Is
the measure truly designed to protect the global commons-an area or
resource outside the jurisdiction of any nation or group of nations? This
question may be more subtle than appears at first glance. For example, the
Netherlands has proposed a measure banning the import of tropical timber
harvested in an unsustainable manner. 215 On one level, this measure is clearly
aimed at certain developing nations, such as the Philippines and Indonesia,
Kathryn Fuller et al., Wildlife Trade Law Implementation in Developing Countries: The
Experience in Latin America, 5 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 289, 292 (1987) (stating that some Latin
American officials "view CITES as an imperialistic effort by foreigners to conserve species at
the exporting countries' expense"); Carolyn D. Greenwood, Note, Restrictions on the Expor-
tation of Hazardous Products to the Third World: Regulatory Imperialism or Ethical Respon-
sibility?, 5 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 129 (1985).
214. This paper does not address the question of which is the most appropriate institution
to conduct this balancing test. The environmental community is understandably reluctant to
see a trade institution such as the GATT adjudicate disputes between trade interests and
environmental interests. However, as Richard Stewart points out, there is no reason in principle
why future GATT dispute resolution panels would not be able to utilize a balancing test
similar to that proposed in this article. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environ-
ment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & La L. REv. 1329, 1349 (1992).
Moreover, environmental expertise may be inserted into the GATT dispute settlement process
in several different ways. First, individuals serving on the dispute settlement panels might be
chosen, in part, because of their environmental expertise. Second, panels can request input
from international organizations with environmental expertise. See Thailand Cigarette Panel
Report, supra note 69, para. 50, at 1134 (requesting information from World Health Organ-
ization on public health effects of cigarettes, in resolving challenge to restrictions on importation
of cigarettes). Finally, panels could permit environmental nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), or others, to file amicus submissions.
A variety of other institutional fora have been proposed for resolutions of this type of
dispute. For example, some people advocate expanded environmental jurisdiction for the
International Court of Justice. See UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES &
SIERRA CLum, UNrrxNo NATIONS FOR THE EARTH 16-17 (1990). Others have argued for the
creation of a new World Environmental Court. See, e.g., Amedeo Postiglione, A More
Efficient International Law on the Environment and Setting Up an International Court for
the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 ENvTL. L. 321 (1990). As this article seeks to
shift the debate from one over institutional form to one over the appropriate analytic framework
that ought to be used in resolving such disputes, it takes no position on the desirability or
practicality of any of the institutional proposals that have been advanced.
215. See CAIRNcRoss, supra note 4, at 315.
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which are destroying their forests at an alarming rate. 2 6 One could therefore
argue that this measure is aimed at a resource within another country and
not at a global commons resource. However, tropical forests act as important
"sinkholes" for greenhouse gases, and thus help preserve the atmosphere,
a global commons resource. In addition, these forests serve as a home for
a significant number of animal and plant species. Conserving forests helps
to preserve biodiversity. 2 7 Given the interrelatedness of environmental re-
sources, I would urge a liberal interpretation of whether a particular trade
measure is aimed at protecting the global commons, as opposed to a local
resource. 2 1
2. Strength of the Interest
If the measure at issue is designed to protect the global commons, it is
necessary to determine the strength of the interest in the resource being
protected. This can be accomplished in two different ways. One approach
would involve a determination of whether the specific environmental interest
at stake is protected by customary or treaty law.21 9 Thus, to evaluate the
U.S. law at issue in the tuna/dolphin case, one could look at whether the
,dolphins protected by the MMPA are protected by CITES, the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), or other applicable
international environmental laws.
Measures concerning resources not protected by international environ-
mental law-which is a relatively new field-could be justified by scientific
evidence regarding the specific environmental threat. For example, in the
216. See id. at 38-41.
217. For these reasons, I would consider measures designed to save tropical forests as
aimed at protecting a'global commons resource. The U.S. government has taken the same
position. William Stevens, U.S., Trying to Buff Its Image, Defends the Forests, N.Y. TImEs,
June 7, 1992, at A20. Many developing nations reject this view. See id. For example, Malaysia
has argued that "[florests are clearly a sovereign resource-not like atmosphere or oceans,
which are global commons." James Brooke, Delegates from 4 Nations Warm to High-Profile
Role: Global Powerbroker, N.Y. TimEs, June 12, 1992, at A10 (quoting Malaysian diplomat
Wen Lian Ting). An interesting exploration of this issue from a developing nation perspective
is presented in Jos6 Goldemberg & Eunice Ribeirodurham, Amazonia and National Security,
2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 22 (1990).
218. Of course, this argument can be stretched beyond its breaking point. At a meeting
under the auspices of the OECD in late 1991, a Japanese delegate argued that Japan's ban
on importation of a certain unnamed agricultural product-which one might assume to be
rice-was justified as protecting a global commons resource. He argued that permitting imports
of this product would cause certain unnamed nations-which one can assume includes the
United States-to convert undeveloped land to agricultural uses, with resulting soil erosion,
runoff into rivers and oceans, and environmental degradations. Private communication with
U.S. government official (Nov. 1991).
219. Of course, reliance on international law in this manner may raise a series of difficult
questions: Is the asserted norm relied upon to restrict trade really international law? If so, is
the norm sufficiently determinate to, in some sense, authorize or justify the trade measure at
issue? Does the international norm set a floor or ceiling with respect to unilateral action?
These and other questions would have to be answered in each particular case.
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tuna/dolphin case, the United States might be able to justify the MMPA's
trade measures if scientific evidence regarding dolphin population, mortality
rates, reproduction rates, and incidental taking rates revealed a threat to
the continued existence of dolphins in the ETP.
This analysis raises the controversial question of the level of scientific
certainty required before trade measures are justified. This issue was prom-
inent in the debate over ozone depletion.20 The European Community
initially opposed the inclusion of trade measures against nonparties in the
Montreal Protocol, in part because of scientific uncertainty over the effects
of CFCs on the ozone layer.? 1 Similarly, there are at present outstanding
scientific questions over the magnitude and rate of climate change.22
These examples suggest that two separate issues need to be addressed.
First, is there sufficient information to arrive at an accurate assessment of
risk? Second, how does one distinguish between an acceptable level of risk
and a risk that justifies trade restrictions? Neither of these issues admits of
a precise or universal answer; ultimately the global community will exercise
political judgments when resolving these issues.
The international community has made impressive strides in learning
how to work cooperatively to enhance scientific research and to narrow
ranges of scientific uncertainty. The United Nations Environmental Pro-
gramme (UNEP) used scientists from different nations to create international
committees that facilitated agreement in the negotiations leading to the Basel
Convention.m When scientific uncertainty threatened to derail attempts to
control ozone-depleting chemicals, different international groupings of scien-
tists were able to pool resources and expertise to become the driving force
behind ozone diplomacy.? 4
A determination of the acceptable level of risk will turn, in large part,
upon judgments reflecting a particular society's values. Different nations
can legitimately have different tolerances for risk.m However, with respect
to risks that threaten irreversible ecological damage, common sense would
suggest that we err on the side of caution.? To wait for irrefutable scientific
220. LYDIA DtrrTro & HAROLD SCHIFF, THE OZONE WAR (1978).
221. Richard E. Benedick, Protecting the Ozone Layer: New Directions in Diplomacy, in
PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENvmoNMErr, supra note 151, at 112, 125-37.
222. See, e.g., Jane S. Shaw & Richard L. Stroup, Global Warming and Ozone Depletion,
in EcoNoMIcs AND m ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 159, 159-79 (1990). The Wall Street
Journal recently suggested, with slight overstatement, that "whether temperatures will rise that
much and when are the subjects of brawls at scientific conferences." Bob Davis, The Outlook,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1992, at Al.
223. Christopher Hilz & Mark Radka, The Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, in NINE CASE STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRON-
MENTAL NEGOTIATION 79, 101-02 (Lawrence E. Susskind et al. eds., 1990).
224. RICHARD E. BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY 5, 9-22, 204 (1991).
225. Id. at 23-25 (outlining differences'between U.S. and European approaches to risk in
context of ozone depletion).
226. The notion that states should not engage in acts posing a potential threat to the
environment, even if there is no conclusive scientific evidence that the acts cause environmental
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proof that, for example, the ozone layer is being depleted, may be to
prohibit action until the problem becomes worse or irreversible. 2 7 As a
recent World Bank paper stated in the context of global climate change:
"When confronted with risks which could be menacing, cumulative, and
irreversible, uncertainty argues strongly in favour of prudent action and
against complacency.'"'2
In evaluating this prong of the balancing test, the nation imposing the
trade restriction ought to have the burden of producing evidence to dem-
onstrate that the restriction has a scientific foundation. The nation chal-
lenging the measure caD introduce evidence that the resource protected by
the trade barrier is not threatened, or that the regulated trade does not
threaten the resource. It is likely that nations will be able to demonstrate
at least some scientific evidence in support of their trade restrictions, and
setting this relatively minimal standard runs the risk that nations might seek
to cloak protectionist measures in scientific garb. However, the proffered
scientific rationale would be subject to challenge, and nations that enact
blatantly protectionist measures will not be able to demonstrate the requisite
interest in the environmental resources they purport to protect. 229
damage, is known as the precautionary principle. Commentators are starting to argue that the
precautionary principle is emerging as a principle of customary international law. See, e.g.,
James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The Precautionary Principle: A Fundamental Principle of
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 1 (1991).
227. International legal instruments have adopted this approach. Id. at 4-18 (collecting
sources).
The U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed this type of approach in the domestic context.
The Court has recognized that states have a legitimate interest in protecting against imperfectly
understood environmental risks. "The constitutional principles underlying the commerce clause
cannot be read as requiring the [States] to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible
environmental damage has occurred . . . before it acts to avoid such consequences." Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397
(D. Me. 1984)).
228. MICHAEL GRUBB, THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: NEGOTIATING TARors 8 n.15 (1989)
(quoting E. ARRHENIUS & T. WALTZ, THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (forthcoming)).
229. One example of a trade barrier that would appear to lack a scientific foundation is
the EC's ban on the sale or importation of meat treated with growth hormones. Council
Directive 85/649, arts. 5, 6(I), 1985 O.J. (L 382) 229-30. These hormones had been approved
for use by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Commission as well as the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration. Elizabeth Ross, U.S. Challenges EC Plan to Ban Treated Beef, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 21, 1988, at 3. An inquiry commissioned by the EC "was disbanded
when it became clear it would find no evidence beef-fattening steroids were damaging to
humans." Christiana Mackenzie, European Community Beefs About Use of U.S. Meat
Hormones, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 24, 1988, at 14. An extended discussion of this
trade barrier, and the U.S. response, is found in Werner P. Meng, The Hormone Conflict
Between the EEC and the United States Within the Context of GATT, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
819 (1990); Adridn R. Halpern, Comment, The U.S.-EC Hormone Beef Controversy and the
Standards Code: Implications for the Application of Health Regulations to Agricultural Trade,
14 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 135 (1989); Steven J. Rothberg, Note, From Beer to BST:
Circumventing the GATT Standards Code's Prohibition on Unnecessary Obstacles to Trade,
75 MINN. L. REV. 505 (1990).
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This relatively deferential standard toward the determination of the
interest in a global commons resource is appropriate for at least two reasons.
First, as reflected in the precautionary principle, the nature and magnitude
of global environmental threats counsels special deference to measures
enacted to preserve global environmental resources. Second, global commons
resources fall within the jurisdiction of no particular nation. Thus, "those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon" 23° will tend to systematically
undervalue global commons resources.
The allusion to United States v. Carolene Products Co.231 is intended
to suggest a loose analogy between traditionally underrepresented interests
that receive heightened judicial solicitude in U.S. courts, and the global
commons resources that are unrepresented in the international political
arena. Nations can trigger a tragedy of the commons232 as surely as domestic
political majorities can trample the fundamental interests of political mi-
norities. Thus, there is little reason to suspect that nations will tend to
overprotect global commons resources. Moreover, the international com-
munity enjoys a generalized benefit as the result of unilateral acts to protect
global commons resources. Therefore, when considering the strength of the
environmental interest, it is appropriate to adopt a relatively deferential
approach to the sanctioning state's evaluation of that interest. The other
prongs of the balancing test will ensure that the use of green trade barriers
is properly limited.
3. Nondiscrimination Principles
Restrictions on trade should not discriminate among foreign products,
or between foreign and domestic goods. These principles are already deeply
embedded in international trade law.233 For example, under GATT Article
I, all contracting parties are required to .extend most-favored-nation treat-
ment (MFN) to all other parties. Under this principle, any advantage or
concession regarding conditions of trade extended to one nation must be
immediately and unconditionally extended to all GATT parties. The most-
favored-nation principle is also found in other treaties dealing with inter-
230. United States v. Carolene prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
231. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
232. Garrett Hardin's argument that resources in a commons will be overexploited is
applicable to global commons resources. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
233. The most-favored-nation clause dates back to the twelfth century, see STAFF OF
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 93D CONG., 2D Sass., THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE
PROVISION, ExECUTiVE BRANCH GATT STUDY No. 9 (Comm. Print 1974), while'the obligation
to extend national treatment to imported goods is part of customary international law. See
BROWNLIE, supra note 101, at 518-51.
Similar nondiscrimination principles run through dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence. State statutes that facially discriminate against interstate commerce are subject to a
"virtually per se rule of invalidity," and are routinely held to violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. See, e.g., Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2015 (1992);
City of'Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
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national economic law, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Articles of Agreement 234 and many bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce
and navigation. 25 The obligation not to discriminate between foreign and
domestic goods is found in GATT Article III, which requires "national
treatment" for imports. Under this Article, parties must treat imported
products no less favorably than like or competing domestic products.
These principles further the interests in sovereignty and political har-
mony by requiring a sanctioning state to treat all other nations equally.
Moreover, by requiring the sanctioning state to treat imports no less
favorably than domestic products, these principles force that state to absorb
its share of any costs generated by its trade barrier.
In addition, these principles favor developing and less powerful states. 26
A trade "deal" between two large nations may, through application of the
MFN principle, create economic benefits for smaller nations .237 Absent the
obligation to extend most-favored-nation status, some nations might "be
tempted to form particular discriminatory international groupings." 2s It is
likely that the discriminatory effects of such groupings would fall on states
not powerful or rich enough to ensure their participation in the grouping. 2 9
Similarly, the national treatment obligation is designed to preclude protec-
tionist legislation. As developing nations are often more dependent than
developed nations upon exports,2m this principle provides important assur-
ances of market access for their products341
Application of the nondiscrimination principle is well-illustrated by a
GATT dispute between Canada and the United States.4 2 During the 1970s,
the United States rejected Canada's assertion of a 200 mile exclusive
economic zone. During the course of this disagreement, Canada seized
nineteen U.S. fishing vessels within this 200 mile zone.243 Shortly thereafter,
the United States prohibited the importation of certain fish products from
Canada.244 This trade barrier was implemented pursuant to the 1976 Fishery
Conservation and Management Act, which directed the Secretary of the
234. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat.
1401, 2 U.N.T.S. 39.
235. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-
Japan, arts. XIV, XVI, 4 U.S.T. 2063.
236. PETER MOSER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GATT 28 (1990).
237. JACKSON, supra note 121, at 277.
238. Id. at 135.
239. Nevertheless, some developing nations have argued against the MFN principle and
in favor of a regime that grants special privileges to developing nations. Id.
240. WCED, supra note 1, at 67.
241. On the other hand, some developing nations have argued that they should be able
to utilize internal taxes and regulations as a form of protection necessary for economic
development. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 278 (1969).
242. Report of the GA 7T Panel, United States-Prohibition of Imports of Tuna and
Tuna Products from Canada, GATT Doc. L/5198 (Feb. 22, 1982), BISD 29th Supp. 91
[hereinafter Canadian Tuna Panel Report].
243. Id. para. 2. 1, at 92.
244. 44 Fed. Reg. 53,118 (1979) (general notice).
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Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish and fish products from any
nation that seizes U.S. vessels in waters that the other state claimed as
territorial, where the United States did not recognize that claim.24,
Canada initiated dispute resolution proceedings, and the United States
argued that the import ban was justified under the GATT Article XX(g)
exception for measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources. "2 Under GATT jurisprudence, a measure can be justified under
this article only if it is applied in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production.24 7 However, the Panel noted that there were no similar restric-
tions on U.S. products.2 For this reason, the embargo could not be justified
under Article XX(g), and was deemed to violate the GATT.24 9
Application of the nondiscrimination principle urged here would support
the Panel's result. In this dispute, the U.S. import ban violated two branches
of the nondiscrimination principle. First, by singling, out tuna imported
from Canada and not addressing tuna imported from any other nation, this
embargo violated the MFN principle. Second, the differential treatment of
Canadian and domestic tuna violated the "national treatment" principle.
For these reasons, the U.S. ban would violate the nondiscrimination prong
of the balancing test set forth here.
4. Means Should Be Related and Proportionate
to the Environmental Goal
Two other limiting principles should be used. The means employed
should be related to and proportionate to the environmental interest to
be protected. Again, these principles are well established in international
law. For example, the doctrine of proportionality acts as a limit on state
action in several different contexts. Significantly, in the context of
economic sanctions, it is well settled that sanctions causing dispropor-
tionate effects violate international law. 25 0 Similarly, the principle of
proportionality acts as a restraint on state action in the divergent areas
of use-of-force and self-defense, 25 ' humanitarian law, 2 2 human rights
245. 16 U.S.C. § 1825 (1988).
246. Canadian Tuna Panel Report, supra note 242, para. 3.5., BISD 29th Supp. at 97.
247. Id. para. 4.9, at 108.
248. Id. para. 4.12, at 109.
249. Id. para. 4.15, at 109.
250. See, e.g., Richard B: Bilder, Comments on the Legality of the Arab Oil Boycott, 12
TEX. INT'L L.J. 41, 44 (1977); Jost Delbriick, Proportionality, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 396, 399 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1984).
251. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103, para. 194
(June 27); see also D.W. GREIG, INTERNATIONAL LAW 886-87 (2d ed. 1976); MYRES S.
McDouGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 211-14
(1961).
252. Applying the principle of proportionality, international humanitarian law prohibits,
inter alia, the use of weapons causing unnecessary suffering and military actions causing
excessive collateral damage to civilian populations or objects. Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
June 10, 1977, arts. 35, 48-67, 16 I.L.M. 1391. See generally MICHAEL BoTI-E ET AL., NEw
RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS (1982).
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law, 253 and the law of treaties. 254
The notion that a state sanction or action must be related to the
offensive activity that it seeks to halt is also rooted in international law.
As Jost Delbriick ably summarized this idea in the context of economic
sanctions, "a due relation between means and ends has to be observed, lest
the coercive measures become illegal as a prohibited act of intervention into
the internal affairs of the State addressed by the measures." 25
The use of the doctrines of proportionality and relatedness as limiting
principles in this context is intended to act as a check on the protectionist
impulse. If the use of purse seine nets to catch tuna is a major cause of
dolphin deaths, then it is sensible-under the relatedness test-to restrict
the imports of tuna caught in this manner. However, under the relatedness
test, the United States could not seek to further its interest in dolphin
conservation by banning the importation of Mexican beer or textiles. The
proportionality principle suggests that if catching tuna in this way is a
relatively minor cause of dolphin deaths, and more serious causes of such
deaths had gone unaddressed, 2 6 then a ban on tuna which restricted a great
deal of trade might not be justified. 25 7
5. The Trade Measure Need Not Be the Least Trade Restrictive Measure
Available
Finally, in sharp distinction from the legal test utilized by GATT panels,
the balancing test urged here does not require that the green trade barrier
be the "least trade restrictive" measure available.
GATT panels have incorporated a "least trade restrictive" test when
considering whether trade measures are justified under Article XX. As a
panel stated when considering whether a trade barrier could be justified on
health and safety grounds:
a contracting party cannot justify a measure... as "necessary" in
terms of Article XX[d] if an alternative measure which it could
reasonably be expected to employ and which is not inconsistent
with other GATT provisions is available to it .... [I]n cases where
a [GATT consistent measure] is not reasonably available, a con-
253. See, e.g., MYREs S. McDouoAL ET AL., HuMAN Ri-ITs AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
813-14 (1980).
254. Delbrfick, supra note 250, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 250,
at 399; 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 141 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
255. Delbrfick, supra note 250, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 250,
at 399.
256. For example, the use of large-scale pelagic driftnets causes a significant number of
marine mammal deaths. See, e.g., Leslie A. Davis, North Pacific Pelagic Driftnetting: Untan-
gling the High Seas Controversy, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1057, 1067, 1071-75 (1991).
257. Use of these principles may well limit the effectiveness of trade restrictions. Unless
a nation provides a major market for the product at issue, trade restrictions may not be an
effective tool. However, failure to limit the use of trade barriers in this way invites protectionism
and retaliatory measures.
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tracting party is bound to use, among the measures reasonably
available to it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency
with other GATT provisions.28g
In application, this test has been almost impossible to meet. For example,
in the Thailand Cigarette case, the Thai government restricted the impor-
tation of foreign cigarettes to protect the health of its citizens. The GATT
Panel found that this measure was not "necessary" because the Thai
government's goals could be met- by measures that were less restrictive of
trade. The Panel reasoned that the government could have employed label-
ling and product disclosure regulations-which enhance public knowledge
of the content of cigarettes2 9-and a ban on cigarette advertising-which
would curb demand for cigarettes. 26° These measures would have been less
trade restrictive than the import ban utilized by the Thai government.
Significantly, the Panel did not consider the relative effectiveness of the
import ban as opposed to labelling and advertising regulations.
The balancing test urged here does not incorporate a "least trade
restrictive" standard for several reasons. First, such a test creates a hierarchy
where trade interests take precedence over global environmental interests.
This universal privileging of trade interests over ecological interests can, in
certain instances, seriously devalue the international environmental interest
at stake.26' Since certain green trade barriers may serve paramount environ-
mental interests-at minimal cost to the trade regime-it makes little sense
to, a priori, privilege one set of interests over the other. A well-designed
balancing test will be sensitive to the varying strengths of the various
interests in any particular clash between trade and environmental interests. 262
Moreover, as a practical matter, green trade barriers will not survive
scrutiny under a legal test that employs such a hierarchy of trade over
environmental interests. Creative counsel challenging a green trade barrier
should always be able to posit a less trade restrictive alternative than the
means employed by a government. As the Tuna/Dolphin and Thailand
Cigarette cases illustrate, green trade barriers will systematically fail a least
trade restrictive test.
Instead of a hierarchy, I urge a balancing of the interest in preservation
of the global commons with the interests in economic efficiency, sovereignty,
and political harmony. I advocate this balancing framework, rather than
258. Thailand Cigarette Panel Report, supra note 69, para. 74, at 1137-38 (citation
omitted).
259. Id. para. 77, at 1138.
260. Id. para. 78, at 1138-39.
261. For example, the GATT Secretariat has recently indicated that the trade restrictions
found in the Montreal Protocol are not consistent with GATT obligations. See GATT
SEcRTARIAT, supra note 4, at 11-12. This observation, based on a formalistic reading of the
GATT, utterly fails to account for the significant environmental interests served by this ground-
breaking treaty.
262. Cf. William K. Stevens, Economists Strive to Find Environment's Bottom Line, N.Y.
Tias, Sept. 8, 1992, at Cl.
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rigid rules, because definite rules are inappropriate in this area. Global
environmental protection and liberalized trade are both legitimate and
important values that states can advance. For this reason, one should not-
as the trade regime does-create a hierarchy where one set of interests
always trumps the other set. Some trade measures serve more pressing
interests than others do, and different trade restrictions impose different
costs upon the global trading order. There should be no a priori winner in
any particular conflict between the interests in liberalized trade and the
interests in environmental protection.
. B. Application to the GA TT Dispute
How does the U.S. tuna embargo fare under the balancing test urged
above? It seems clear that this green trade barrier was designed to protect
a global commons resource-dolphins in the high seas.263 However, what is
the strength of the interest in conserving these dolphins? International law
does not provide a strong justification for this trade barrier. The dolphins
protected by the MMPA are not protected by the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species, and the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)264 provides, at best, only. weak support.
Under UNCLOS III, "States have the obligation to protect and preserve
the marine environment. '265 Article 119 of this treaty authorizes nations
generally to protect the living resources of the high seas. More particularly,
Article 120 authorizes states to take measures to protect marine mammals
in the high seas. By reference, Article 120 permits states to "prohibit, limit
or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals" found in the high seas.
Thus, at best, it seems that UNCLOS III authorizes, but does not require,
limitations or prohibitions on the taking of marine mammals in the high
seas.
However, the authority granted by UNCLOS III is not unlimited. First,
while it is clear that nations are permitted to protect the resources of the
high seas by regulating the conduct of their own citizens, 2" no express
authorization exists to protect these resources by regulating the conduct of
non-nationals. Thus, UNCLOS III provides no express authorization for
the United States to attempt to regulate the environmental practices of the
Mexican fishing fleet in the high seas.
267
263. Although the definition of the ETP for MMPA purposes does cover some waters
within the exclusive economic zones of other nations, neither the parties nor the panel addressed
this issue.
264. UNCLOS III, supra note 178. Although UNCLOS III has not entered into force,
this treaty represents customary international law with respect to the principles relating to
conservation of the living resources of the high seas.
265. Id. art. 192, at 1308.
266. Article 117 provides that states "have the duty to take ... such measures for their
respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the
high seas." Id. art. 117, at 1291 (emphasis added).
267. Indeed, the express provision of authority to regulate conduct of a state's own
citizens may be read as an implicit rejection of authority to regulate the conduct of non-
nationals.
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Moreover, under UNCLOS III, States are further obliged to "ensure
that conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in
form or in fact against the fishermen of any State."' 2 As explained more
fully below, it appears that the MMPA in fact discriminates against foreign
fleets. Thus, UNCLOS III does not appear to provide significant support
to a unilateral U.S. trade measure to govern the conduct of Mexican
fishermen.
Can scientific evidence justify the U.S. tuna embargo? Not on the
record before the tuna/dolphin panel.269 The United States conceded that
there was no substantial evidence demonstrating that dolphin populations
found in the Eastern Tropical Pacific-the only part of the ocean covered
by the regulations at issue-were threatened with extinction. 2 0 In fact,
substantial evidence existed that the number of dolphins in the ETP had
remained constant in recent years.27' In addition, those species of dolphins
that are endangered are not even found inside the areas of the ocean covered
by the MMPA regulations. 272 These factorg suggest that the international
environmental interest being protected by the tuna embargo was not espe-
cially strong.
Nor did the United States demonstrate that the statute is clearly related
to an interest in dolphin conservation. Obviously, at some level the number
of dolphin takings will threaten the population. However, there was abso-
lutely no showing before the GATT panel that the number of incidental
takings permitted by the U.S. regulations bore any relation to this number.
Thus, the United States failed to establish the relation between the trade
measure and the interest it sought to protect.
Moreover, on the record before the GATT Panel, there was strong
evidence of protectionist elements behind this particular measure. The
regulations at- issue apply only to tuna caught in one portion of the Pacific
ocean. 273 However, these waters are primarily fished by foreign fleets and
268. UNCLOS III, supra note 178, art. 119, at 1291.
269. Under GATT dispute resolution rules, the submissions to and the proceedings before
a GAIT panel are considered confidential. GATT panel reports are also considered confidential;
however, the Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report was released by GATT after it had been leaked to
the media in various nations. See GA TT Understanding, supra note 37, annex (6)(iv), BISD
26th Supp. at 217-18.
270. The Federal Register notice announcing the final rule regarding the MMPA import
restrictions states: "[The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] agrees that no
substantial evidence exists which indicates that dolphin populations in the ETP are threatened
with extinction." 55 Fed. Reg. 11,921, 11,922 (1990) (proposed Mar. 30, 1990).
271. Research conducted by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and by the
U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service indicates that the dolphin stocks are healthy and
sustaining current mortality rates. Id.; see also NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REDUCING
DOLPHIN MORTALrrY FROM TUNA FISHING 43-54 (1992) (reviewing numerous studies which
reveal no statistically significant trends in last five years with respect to dolphin population in
ETP) [hereinafter DoLPHIN MORTALrrY].
272. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 3.44, at 1607.
273. See 50 C.F.R. § 216.3 (1991) (setting out latitudinal and longitudinal boundaries of
portion of ETP affected).
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the majority of the U.S. tuna fleet fishes in other waters.2 74 In fact, as of
the time of the Panel report, only four U.S. tuna boats fished in this
portion of the ocean.275 As a result of the announcement by U.S. tuna
canners that they would no longer buy tuna caught in association with
dolphins in the ETP, it is likely that the remaining U.S. tuna operators in
the ETP will either abandon the area or sell their vessels.
27 6
There is also evidence that the U.S. fleet kills significant numbers of
dolphins off the Alaskan coast without operating under special regulations
similar to those applied to the ETP.2 77 Thus, it appears that the regulation
is primarily designed to control the behavior of foreign fleets, rather than
as an evenhanded regulation of foreign and domestic fleets.
In addition, there is a strong argument that the MMPA discriminates
against foreign fleets in another way. Foreign fleets must have an incidental
taking rate that is "comparable" to that of the U.S. fleet. However, there
is no way for these fleets to know in advance what the U.S. incidental
taking rate will be, so they cannot know in advance how to structure their
conduct so that they do not run afoul of the relevant regulations.
2 7 8
Additionally, under the MMPA, there are different formulas for cal-
culating the average rate of incidental takings of marine mammals per set
(ARITMM), of U.S. and foreign fleets. Although it is not clear whether
this discriminates in favor of or against any particular foreign fleet, 79 there
is no dispute that foreign and domestic fleets are treated differently. Finally,
the MMPA arguably discriminates against foreign fishermen because it
imposes a ban on the importation of all Mexican tuna, even if a particular
274. In 1989, tuna taken in association with dolphins in the ETP was caught by 123
vessels from nine nations. Twenty-nine of these vessels flew. the U.S. flag. DOLPHIN MORTALITY,
supra note 271, at 24.
275. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 3.22, at 1604.
276. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TUNA: COMPETITIVE CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE U.S.
AND EUROPEAN TUNA INDUSTRIES IN DoMEsTIc AND FOREIGN MARKETS 2-5 (1990) [hereinafter
COM'ETITIVE CONDmONS]. Indeed, by 1991, only two U.S. vessels were using purse seine nets
to catch yellowfin in the ETP. 56 Fed. Reg. 50,672 (1991) (proposed Oct. 8, 1991).
277. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 3.28, at 1606. Although the United
States argued before the Panel that tunas associate with dolphins only in the ETP, this assertion
is belied by a subsequent government report stating that "this association has been observed-
and used by fishermen-in other oceans." DOLPHIN MORTALITY, supra note 271, at 38 (listing
citations).
278. This is not the argument adopted by the GATT Panel. The Panel relied on the
"unpredictability" of the MMPA's quota system to conclude that the embargo was not the
least trade restrictive measure available, and hence not "necessary" for purposes of Article
XX. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, para. 5.28, at 1620. The "nondiscrimination"
test urged here does not require that the trade barrier be the least trade restrictive measure
available. Rather, it demands that foreign fleets not be treated less favorably than the domestic
fleet. When the domestic fleet knows-in advance-how to structure its activities to comply
with the statute, but it is impossible for the foreign fleet to know-in advance-how to
structure its activities so' as to comply with the statute, the statute treats foreign fleets less
favorably than the domestic fleet.
279. Tuna/Dolphin Panel Report, supra note 16, paras. 3.22-.23, 3.25, at 1604-05.
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Mexican vessel caught its tuna outside the ETP and did so in a manner
that did not threaten dolphins.
Turning to the final factor to be ev.aluated, it appears that the ban on
Mexican tuna has a minimal impact on the global trading order. Mexican
tuna exports totalled approximately 56 million dollars in 1990.2 0 However,
sales to the United States account for only about 1.5 million dollars per
year, about three percent of Mexico's total tuna exports.2 1 Thus, exports
to the United States are not a significant portion of the Mexican export
market. Similarly, Mexican imports do not constitute a significant portion
of the U.S. tuna market. Mexican imports represent, in dollar figures, less
than one percent of total U.S. tuna consumption. 212 Thus, whether in
absolute terms, as a percentage of Mexican exports or as a percentage of
U.S. imports, the ban on yellowfin from Mexico does not have a dispro-
portionate effect on the world trading system.
283
Based solely upon the record before the GATT Panel, one is forced to
conclude that (1) there was a relatively weak international environmental
interest at stake; (2) the United States failed to show the requisite relation
between the MMPA's trade measures and the environmental interests they
sought to further; and (3) the MMPA's trade restrictions appear to violate
the nondiscrimination principle. Therefore, on this record, the tuna embargo
should not be permitted. 2"
280. Mark A. Uhlig, U.S.-Mexico Pact Faces Hurdle on Tuna Fishing, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr.
4, 1991, at D2.
281. Damian Fraser, Mexico Condemns US Ban on Its Tuna, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
26, 1991, at 30; David Clark Scott, Mexico Chafes as US Revisits Ban on Tuna Imports
Involving Dolphin, CMusiAN SCI. MoNrroR, Feb. 27, 1991, at 6.
282. U.S. tuna consumption totalled S1.6 billion in 1989. Co~M-arVE CONDITONS, supra
note 276, at 1-1.
283. At first glance, the proportionality prong of the balancing test might appear to
support perverse results. Would it tend to permit an embargo against a nation that catches
and exports relatively few tuna-and presumably kills relatively few dolphins-but cut against
a trade barrier directed at a nation that exports a great deal of tuna-and therefore presumably
kills a greater number of dolphins? In other words, does the proportionality prong permit
trade barriers that will have relatively little effect, and strike barriers designed to counter
greater ecological harms?
This paradox is more apparent than real. Under the balancing test urged here, a green
trade barrier should be evaluated by reference to its total effect on trade, and not by its effect
on just one trading partner. Practically, this means that tribunals applying this test must have
access to world trade data. Analytically, the use of global trading data parallels the evaluation
of the global environmental interest at stake, rather than the environmental interest of just
one nation or another. Thus, the test urged here seeks a balancing of the global interest in
liberalized trade and the global interest in various environmental resources, rather than the
more difficult enterprise of balancing the trade interests of one nation or group of nations
against the environmental interests of one or several different nations.
284. It appears that the tuna/dolphin dispute between the United States and Mexico may
be settled by an international treaty. The United States, Mexico and Venezuela have entered
into a tentative agreement to impose a five-year moratorium on purse-seine fishing in the
ETP. Michael Parrish, Pact May Stop Dolphin Deaths in Tuna Fishing, L.A. TIMEs, June 17,
1992, at Al. The House of Representatives recently passed legislation, H.R. 5419, that would
implement such an agreement. See House Approves Bill That Would End Tuna Embargoes
Against Mexico, Venezuela, BNA INT'L ErvTL. DAILY, Sept. 28, 1992.
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V. CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to address the argument that permitting green
trade barriers would undermine the international trade regime. In particular,
I have attempted to articulate a legal test that would both permit and
constrain the use of green trade barriers to protect global commons re-
sources. This balancing test undermines the "slippery slope" argument by
identifying a set of principles that can be used to distinguish legitimate
from illegitimate forms of green trade barriers. The analysis presented above
also represents-at least with respect to resources in the global commons-
a partial response to the question posed by this Symposium: Are free trade
and environmental quality interdependent goals or in irreconcilable conflict?
Unlike many of the other authors contributing to this Symposium, I
do not focus on questions of institutional reform. Although these questions
are important and perplexing, I believe that an exclusive scholarly focus on
these issues at this time is misplaced. Scholars and policymakers are just
starting to explore the relationship of the international trade and environ-
mental regimes. The common point of departure is that liberalized trade
and environmental protection are appropriate ends to be pursued. The
question is how to do so.
The task of first-generation scholarship, like that published in this
Symposium, ought to be "to provide an analytical structure for thinking
through the issues of law and policy" presented by this relationship. 215
Absent an analytical structure to identify the relevant issues-to frame the
appropriate questions-it is surely difficult to make informed recommen-
dations regarding institutional reform. Thus, as an analytic matter, the
initial task for scholars ought to be to identify the underlying interests and
policy preferences in this area. Once this task is completed, it will be
possible to suggest institutional reforms designed to further these interests
and preferences.
This article seeks to further this preliminary task. Others may disagree
with the limiting principles I recommend, or with my application of these
principles to the tuna/dolphin dispute. However, such objections would
spark a debate that is more sensitive to the underlying interests than the
current debate over whether and how to reform the GATT.
I recognize that the balancing test proposed above will please neither
the environmental community, which is outraged over the tuna/dolphin
decision, nor the trade community, for it may well uphold measures that
restrict more trade than the MMPA embargo. However, a balancing test
like that proposed here represents a significant advance over the legal tests
presently used and institutional reforms others urge, because it attempts to
identify explicitly the various interests at stake and to provide a balanced
and pragmatic response to these competing interests.
285. Stewart, supra note 214, at 1329.
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